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The theory of transgovernmental networks describes how government offi-
cials make law and policy on issues of global concern by coordinating
informally across borders, without legal or official sanction. Scholars have
argued that this sort of coordination is useful in many different areas of
cross-border regulation, including banking, antitrust, environmental pro-
tection, and securities law. One area to which the theory has not yet been
applied is international criminal law. For a number of reasons, until re-
cently, international criminal law had not generated the same
transgovernmental networks that have emerged in other fields. With few
exceptions, international criminal law had been enforced at either the
purely domestic or the international level. That picture appears to be
changing. Investigators, prosecutors, and judges dealing with international
crimes are beginning to collaborate, both with their peers across borders
and with their counterparts at international criminal tribunals. This Article
describes and evaluates these developments and provides a conceptual de-
fense of why networks could be useful in international criminal law. It then
suggests what future forms this sort of cooperation might take and draws
implications from the emergence of international criminal law networks
for the study of networks more generally.
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The theory of transgovernmental networks describes how elements
within the governments of various nations make and affect policy by coor-
dinating with each other informally, without official or formal legal
sanction.' Anne-Marie Slaughter and others have argued that this sort of
coordination is useful in many different areas of cross-border regulation,
including banking, antitrust, environmental protection, and securities law.'
One area to which the theory has not yet been applied is international
criminal law. By its nature, international criminal law transcends national
boundaries. But at least until recently, it had not generated the kinds of in-
formal transgovernmental networks that have emerged in other fields.
Except for a few recent collaborations among international and national
prosecutors and judges serving on hybrid courts, international criminal law
has largely been enforced at either the purely domestic or the international
level.
The picture appears to be changing, however. Investigators, prosecutors,
and judges dealing with international crimes are beginning to collaborate,
both in horizontal networks across borders and in vertical networks with
their counterparts at the international criminal tribunals. This Article de-
scribes and evaluates these developments and concludes that they are likely
to transform the way international criminal law is implemented. These new
mechanisms of interpreting, developing, and enforcing international crimi-
nal law ought to be welcomed, as they are likely to be more inclusive, more
acceptable to domestic populations, and ultimately more effective.
When I use the term "international criminal law," I am referring to the
handful of actions that the international community has seen fit to "criminal-
ize" at the international level-war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. These areas have become the subject of an international criminal
law first because of their scale, severity, and gravity-in other words, the
degree to which they shock the conscience of the entire world. Second, they
1. E.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
2. Id.; Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 127 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001); Anu Piilola, As-
sessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 207 (2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmen-
tal Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Christopher A.
Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review
Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (2005); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in
InternationalAdministration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005).
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often share the characteristic of being crimes that implicate governments
themselves (or other groups that exercise political power), leading to the
concern that the pertinent national authorities will be unwilling or unable to
address the crimes at the national level.
International crimes are, unfortunately, still common around the globe.
In the 1990s alone, almost one million people were murdered during the
genocide in Rwanda, and hundreds of thousands more were killed or abused
in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Uganda, East Timor, Sierra
Leone, and the Congo, among others. Serious human rights violations that
could be classified as international crimes still occur frequently in dozens of
countries around the world.
Enforcement of international criminal law has normally taken one of
two courses. The first is prosecution and adjudication by an international
tribunal, such as the Nuremberg tribunal, the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal
Court. The second method has been prosecution and adjudication in a na-
tional court, whether under theories of universal jurisdiction or by the states
directly affected by the crimes.
What had not occurred until recently-at least not to a significant de-
gree 3-is the appearance of networks of elements in national governments
working together informally to enforce, interpret, and develop international
criminal law. Over the last two decades, the development and interpretation
of international criminal law has been occurring primarily in a centralized
fashion at international tribunals, and its enforcement has proceeded largely
through diplomatic channels.
But the reliance on international tribunals raises obvious concerns about
infringements on national sovereignty. It presents a particularly acute exam-
ple of what Slaughter calls the "globalization paradox"-needing
government at an international level, but fearing it at the same time.4 This
paradox is reflected in current debates about the International Criminal
Court. On the one hand, the International Criminal Court lacks support
among key countries that have the power to make the court truly effective,
especially the United States. As a result, the enforcement of the court's or-
ders, which depends entirely on cooperation by state authorities, will likely
be slow and often ineffective. On the other hand, some of the most serious
human rights violations will remain unaddressed unless some action is taken
at the international level.
Transgovernmental networks could offer an effective response to the
"globalization paradox" in international criminal law. These networks would
involve national and supranational judges, prosecutors, and investigators
who would coordinate and cooperate with each other in more flexible and
3. An exception is the recent creation of several hybrid courts, in which national and inter-
national investigators, prosecutors, and judges have collaborated in interpreting and enforcing
international criminal law. In Section IV.B, I discuss the ways in which these courts operate as an
international criminal law network.
4. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 8.
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informal ways than they currently do in international criminal tribunals. The
cooperation could occur in hybrid courts, through ad hoc agreements, and
through different kinds of international and regional associations. Their mis-
sion could be supported by non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"),
which are already very active in international criminal law.
Such transnational networks could serve a two-fold purpose. They could
remedy national authorities' lack of capacity to enforce international crimi-
nal law by contributing some of the combined resources and expertise of
network participants. At the same time, because of their flexible and decen-
tralized form, networks could better accommodate local political
preferences and enable nations most directly affected by atrocities to play a
more central role in prosecuting them.
Transgovernmental networks are less likely to be effective in situations
in which local authorities are reluctant to prosecute. But even in these cases,
networks could gradually nudge governments toward action. They could pro-
vide the necessary support to make prosecutions more cost-effective. In
addition, they could subtly influence domestic norms by connecting with in-
dividual investigators, prosecutors, and judges, who could advocate
internally for war crimes prosecutions consistent with network standards.
While networks might have various beneficial effects, the strategic struc-
ture of international criminal law does not, at first sight, seem conducive to
their creation or ultimate success. Violations of international criminal law do
not commonly produce externalities that would spur states unaffected by the
crimes to cooperate in redressing them. For instance, American officials are
more likely to provide international assistance for the enforcement of anti-
trust law than of war crimes law. This is because the lack of antitrust
enforcement in another country may directly harm American commercial
interests, whereas crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity, as
grave as they are, may not have significant effects beyond one country's
borders. And while international crimes usually occur in sporadic crises,
other violations that networks address tend to be ongoing problems.
Collaboration is also difficult because views on important international
criminal law questions diverge. While states may agree that core interna-
tional crimes like genocide should be punished and prevented, they often
disagree about the scope of international criminal law and about the proce-
dures by which it should be implemented. These disagreements are
sometimes based on fundamentally different moral judgments-about, for
example, the applicability of the death penalty to international crimes or the
prosecution of juvenile offenders. At other times, they result from diverging
national security priorities. Neither of these types of disagreements could
easily be settled through the informal exchanges that occur in transgovern-
mental networks. Nor could they be resolved through appeals to expertise,
as can sometimes be done in conflicts about regulatory issues, which tend to
be more technical and less political in nature.
Another factor pushing against the establishment of networks in interna-
tional criminal law is rooted in the domestic politics of many of the
countries where international crimes have occurred. Government officials in
[Vol. 105:985
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these countries often lack the autonomy needed to forge direct relationships
with their foreign counterparts. Prosecutors' actions in war crimes cases, for
example, may be tightly controlled by the central government. But if they
lack the discretion to apply new methods of prosecuting war crimes law,
these prosecutors could not effectively participate in cross-border networks
that commonly act without the blessing or intervention of chief government
officials.5
These features of international criminal law explain why relatively few
transgovernmental networks have developed so far. But this paper shows
that such networks are emerging slowly, and it identifies several forces that
are increasingly pushing for transgovernmental cooperation in international
criminal law.
The first force is rhetorical. While international crimes often do not cre-
ate externalities for powerful states, the argument that the international
community must act to prevent and punish international crimes has deep
moral resonance. The moral force of the argument for intervention distin-
guishes international crimes from less poignant regulatory issues, such as
antitrust and securities regulation, and helps propel international cooperation
even in the absence of cross-border effects.
The second force-which builds on the first-is the active involvement
of NGOs in international criminal law. These organizations work to keep
international crimes in the public consciousness and on the agenda of na-
tional governments, even in states not directly affected by international
crimes. Indeed, NGOs do more than lobbying and awareness-raising cam-
paigns. They actively help coordinate transgovernmental efforts in
international criminal law by providing information, expertise, and logistical
help in setting up war crimes tribunals, drafting domestic legislation to im-
plement international criminal law, and spreading best practices through
face-to-face contacts, written manuals, and training programs.6 By promot-
ing domestic legal reform, NGOs empower prosecutors, investigators, and
judges in post-conflict countries to apply international criminal law without
undue intervention by the central government and thus to be effective par-
ticipants in the emerging transnational networks.
Also important to developing international criminal law networks is the
existence of several international and hybrid war crimes tribunals. The inter-
action between investigators, prosecutors, and judges at these tribunals is
likely to have spillover effects and spur greater cooperation at the transgov-
ernmental level. For example, we can expect that prosecutors, judges, and
defense attorneys who have worked on a war crimes tribunal at the interna-
tional level will be eager to apply their expertise elsewhere after their term
5. Cf Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERN-
ANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 287, 298.
6. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. See generally MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLI-
TICS (1998) (offering an empirical study of the rise of transnational networks of non-state actors in
the fields of human rights and environmental politics).
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review
at the international court ends. They are thus likely to become active partici-
pants in transgovernmental networks.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") can be expected to play an
even more central role in promoting such networks. The court's regime of
"complementarity"-under which the court takes up cases only when states
are unwilling or unable to prosecute-has already prompted national au-
thorities to pass implementing legislation and create judicial structures to
deal with international crimes domestically. As such structures become es-
tablished, they are likely to begin cooperating with their counterparts from
other states. The ICC has an incentive to promote such cooperation. The
court depends on national authorities to obtain evidence and custody of sus-
pects and to enforce its judgments, so it will want to ensure that the
authorities are well equipped and committed to provide such assistance.
Moreover, the court is unable to shoulder the full load of international
crimes prosecution, so it has to rely on national courts to handle many of the
trials. For these reasons, the court has an interest in promoting effective
pathways of transnational cooperation. As later Sections discuss in more
detail, it has already sponsored some initiatives toward that end.
Finally, cooperation in international criminal law will be advanced by al-
ready-existing networks in other areas of criminal law. Transgovernmental
networks have begun developing to address "transnational" crimes such as
terrorism, drug-trafficking, and money laundering; it would be easy and
logical for some of these networks to take on responsibilities related to war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The skills required for investigating
and prosecuting transnational and international crimes are similar, and in-
creasingly, there are connections between the two types of crimes.7 These
connections make international crimes more strategically relevant for the
countries that are already cooperating in the fight against terrorism and
drug- and human-trafficking. A concentration of efforts to fight both types
of crimes is already occurring in Europe, where special prosecutors' offices
have been created to address cross-border organized crime, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.
8
As a result of these forces and others, transgovernmental networks in in-
ternational criminal law are beginning to emerge. The primary goal of this
Article is to describe what these are and to suggest what future forms this
sort of cooperation might take. In doing so, it also aims to draw implications
for transgovernmental networks more generally. After reviewing in Part I the
role of networks in international law generally, I will provide in Part I1 a
conceptual defense of why networks could be useful in international crimi-
nal law. In Part III, I will explain what forces may bring into being and then
7. The Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, has asserted
that the armed groups led by Charles Taylor during the Sierra Leonean conflict, which had commit-
ted some of the worst atrocities, had dealings with international terrorist groups, including Al-
Qaeda. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. More recently, the Prosecutor of the ICC has
pointed to the links between international war crimes and financial crimes. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
8. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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sustain international criminal law networks. Thereafter, in Part IV, I will
review emerging networks and discuss what future forms international
criminal law networks might take, using examples from networks in related
areas, and reviewing recent developments in the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law through "hybrid" courts. In Part V, I will examine some
of the likely objections to the practical effects of the networks that may
emerge. Last, I will draw implications from the emergence of international
criminal networks for the study of transgovernmental networks more gener-
ally.
I. A NEW WORLD ORDER OF TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS
Political scientists first pointed to the rise of "transgovernmental" net-
works in the 1970s. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued that foreign
affairs were increasingly shaped by "sets of direct interactions among sub-
units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by
the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments."9 More
recently, Anne-Marie Slaughter has analyzed the proliferation of networks
of government actors and their role in cross-border regulation and interna-
tional law.
According to Slaughter, our "new world order" is increasingly shaped
by alliances of government actors across countries, who are working to-
gether to create and enforce international rules.'0 Such alliances are typically
formed among lower-level government officials charged with implementing
regulatory policy that has cross-border effects. To the extent that these offi-
cials have a certain amount of discretion in implementing the policy, they
can participate in transgovernmental networks without involving central
state authorities. Instead of relaying transnational matters through the State
Department or a foreign affairs ministry, they may interact directly with
their foreign or supranational counterparts.
Some networks are not purely "transgovernmental." They may be embed-
ded within an international organization, such as the European Union, and
some of their participants may be supranational officials. In the European Un-
ion, administrative networks between the European Commission and its
national counterparts have developed to enforce antitrust and information-
privacy laws." Networks may also have inter-governmental elements. Heads
of state may sign an agreement creating the framework within which a net-
work operates, and they may continually set broad priorities for the network's
9. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974).
10. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 21; Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of
the European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807, 821 (2005). Members of the
European Commission have also helped shape the agenda of trans-European networks of prosecu-
tors and law enforcement officials formed to combat the rise of transnational crime in Europe. JbSrg
Monar, Decision-Making in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND
LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 63, 74-76 (Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002).
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operations. Cooperation among antitrust authorities, for example, is often
sanctioned by an agreement among heads of state of the participating coun-
tries." Alternatively, elements of domestic executive, judicial, or legislative
branches may exercise ongoing oversight over the network's functions-for
example, by requiring reports, calling hearings to examine the network's
operations, or reviewing the legality of a particular network action in a judi-
cial proceeding. 3
One of the main advantages of interaction among government officials is
the access it gives them to new sources of specialized knowledge. For this
reason, networks are most likely to arise in response to cross-border prob-
lems whose solutions depend largely on technical expertise rather than on
political judgment. 4 These are the areas in which officials derive the great-
est benefits from sharing knowledge. Coordination is easier for another
reason as well: The less politicized the issue, the more likely participants are
to agree on the policies to be pursued through transgovernmental coopera-
tion. 15 Areas of cross-border regulation that arguably fit that profile, to a
greater or lesser degree, include banking, securities, telecommunications,
and antitrust. While political disagreement exists even in these areas, it is
less frequent, and many disputes can be resolved through appeals to techni-
cal expertise. Unsurprisingly, networks have been very active in these
fields.16 By contrast, areas such as human rights, international criminal jus-
tice, and national security are much more politically sensitive and therefore
less likely to engender transgovernmental cooperation.
Yet even when there is no pre-existing agreement on regulatory priori-
ties, networks may arise if some of the participating states stand to benefit
from adopting the regulatory approach of other states. These benefits may
include attracting foreign investment, receiving trade concessions, or being
admitted to an international organization.'9 An example of this is the rise of
networks in the antitrust area, where lower-level officials from less devel-
oped countries openly cooperate with their counterparts from the European
Union or the United States by adopting rules that would help them attract• 20
investment and aid from these wealthier partners.
12. Devuyst, supra note 2, at 133, 135; Whytock, supra note 2, at 38-39. Similarly, members
of the European Council signed agreements that eventually led to the creation of transnational
criminal law networks such as Europol and Eurojust. John Benyon, Policing the European Union:
The Changing Basis of Cooperation on Law Enforcement, 70 INT'L AFF. 497, 507-11 (1994);
Monar, supra note I1, at 64-67.
13. See Zaring, supra note 2, at 598-600.
14. Whytock, supra note 2, at 30.
15. See Bignami, supra note 1l, at 845.
16. See supra note 2.
17. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 208; Bignami, supra note 11, at 867.
18. Bignami, supra note 11, at 845.
19. Id. (providing the example of foreign investment as a benefit).
20. See Devuyst, supra note 2, at 133; Raustiala, supra note 2, at40-41,60-61.
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Transgovernmental cooperation is also more likely to occur where regu-
lators have already begun interacting with one another in international
organizations." International organizations provide forums for regular ex-
changes among state and agency officials, thus increasing trust and
understanding among them. In this way, they offer a starting point and a
supporting structure for the subsequent, less formal exchanges in networks.
Finally, networks are more likely to develop where the potential partici-
pants have a degree of autonomy from their central governments to act
within their spheres of competence. Studies of cooperation within the Euro-
pean Union have found that transgovernmental cooperation is more likely to
occur in areas where "regulators on each side of the Atlantic enjoy consider-
able de facto or de jure independence from their political masters ....""
This is hardly surprising, because the key to networks' success is their abil-
ity to provide fast and flexible responses to global regulatory problems,
which in turn depends on their independence.
Networks may exercise a number of functions that have traditionally
been left to international organizations or to intergovernmental cooperation
through treaties and executive agreements. They may, for example, work to
harmonize rules to address cross-border problems or coordinate strategies to
enforce already-existing international rules. Good examples of the effort to
create common standards are the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
and the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, which have
issued codes of best practices on regulating banking and securities and on
combating money laundering.23 Networks not only create guidelines for ac-
tion, but also provide forums for longer-term dialogue on issues of global
concern. Intelligence agencies exchange ideas on the fight against terrorism;
legislators from different countries discuss strategies to address common
environmental and public health threats; judges debate the best interpreta-
tion of trade rules or human rights through legal opinions and at
international conferences. In this way, networks help develop international
rules through a decentralized, deliberative process.
Networks promote not only the development, but also the enforcement
of international law. They help strengthen domestic compliance in two prin-
cipal ways. As mentioned earlier, they serve as a conduit for the exchange of
valuable information, as their participants share experiences, create "best
practices" guidelines, and help develop alternative solutions to common
problems. Furthermore, they provide technical assistance to help individual
states realize shared objectives. Environmental law has been an area in
which networks have been successful in promoting domestic compliance
24with international rules. For example, working groups, joint training ses-
sions, and dispute resolution mechanisms created under NAFTA allowed
21. Whytock, supra note 2, at 32.
22. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 5, at 298; see also Whytock, supra note 2, at 31.
23. Zaring, supra note 2, at 555-69.
24. Raustiala, supra note 2, at 48-49.
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regulators from the United States, Mexico, and Canada to pool efforts in
enforcing international environmental rules.25 Other networks, sponsored by
the United Nations, have relied heavily on technical assistance, regular
meetings, and exchanges of information to promote domestic compliance
with environmental law.26
Whether they work to harmonize rules or promote compliance, networks
are successful in large part because they establish ongoing relationships
among individual government agencies or officials. The repeated interac-
tions build trust and produce stable patterns of cooperation. 27 "Aid, pressure,
socialization, and education" influence individuals within the network, mak-
28ing them more likely to cooperate with peers from other states.
At the same time, transgovernmental networks are looser, more flexible
formations than typical international organizations. 2' They generally do not
set rules through the typical process of formal treaty negotiations, but in-
stead rely primarily on "soft-law" mechanisms-that is, standards,
guidelines, and memoranda of understanding.3 ° Their organization consists
largely of peer-to-peer ties among people who work for their respective na-
tional governments, but are not part of a separate international bureaucracy.
3'
Because networks typically lack overarching bureaucratic structures, they
can adapt and respond more quickly to changes in the environment. Their
flexibility also allows them to provide context-sensitive solutions to global
problems. Finally, the soft law of networks, while not binding, is often at
least as effective as traditional "hard-law" mechanisms such as treaties. 32 It
is especially valuable when problems are technically complex or politically
sensitive. For complex technical problems, standards promulgated by a well-
respected network of experts offer easily accessible and credible blueprints
to follow. 33 Politically, too, it is much easier for a government official to
agree to a memorandum of understanding than for a government to enter
into a formal treaty.34
Though networks' ambit is transnational, the primary political allegiance
of their participants rests with national constituencies. And ultimately, the
power to enforce policies and implement strategies remains with national
25. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 53, 57-58, 189-90; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at
the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1558, 1560 (2006).
26. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 66.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Raustiala, supra note 2, at 22; Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-International
Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 716-17 (2006).
31. Raustiala, supra note 2, at 22.
32. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 178-81.
33. Id. at 179, 181.
34. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 50, 70 (Eyal Benvenisti &
Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
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authorities, who can more easily override a network decision than a decision
made by an international organization. This feature is important because it
arguably makes transgovernmental networks more democratically legitimateS - 35
than international organizations. As Slaughter suggests, networks may be a
key to solving the "globalization paradox"-"needing more government and
fearing it."3 Networks may present a method of governing that is both more
effective and more just than either a purely "horizontal," state-centric ap-
proach to global issues, or a "vertical," supranational method of
37
governance.
II. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
At first glance, international criminal law would seem to present a dif-
ferent situation than other areas where networks have formed. International
criminal law is, of course, by nature international-it is already largely
"standardized" across borders (though not entirely so-as I explain later,
many matters of enforcement, interpretation, and punishment still generate
differences among countries affected by international crimes). Treaties and
custom have created definitions of international crimes that are universal
around the globe.38 So international criminal law does not necessarily call
out for further standardization through transgovernmental networks-or at
least not in the same way that, say, securities regulation might.
In fact, further standardization of international criminal law may at some
point become undesirable. To the extent that there are differences in the way
international criminal law is interpreted in various countries and tribunals-
and there are some differences-this may actually be legitimate, as I have
argued elsewhere.39 Criminal law involves judgments about responsibility,
blameworthiness, and appropriate punishment, which are deeply political. It
concerns questions that may have no single right answer and that depend on
the particular moral views and political culture of the affected community.
4 °
While universal agreement exists regarding some of the central elements
of international criminal law, details of interpretation and application may
legitimately differ from country to country. For example, the use of the
35. See infra notes 200-204, 217-220 and accompanying text.
36. SLAUGHTER, supra note I, at 8.
37. Id. at 6-7.
38. E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
39. Jenia lontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L.
1 (2004).
40. For that reason, some commentators have been skeptical of the idea that networks would
be created and would thrive in areas such as international criminal law, which are politicized and
about which a great diversity of views exists. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 208; cf Bignami,
supra note 11, at 867; Whytock, supra note 2, at 28-29.
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death penalty for international crimes, while prohibited in international tri-
bunals,4' is a legitimate choice of punishment in many countries emerging
42from violent conflicts. Similarly, trials in absentia, which are not permitted• 41
at international tribunals, may well have a place in domestic prosecutions,
as they do in many civil law countries." Questions about substantive inter-
national criminal law-for example, what constitutes "proportionality and
necessity" in military action and what is the precise boundary between mili-
tary and civilian targets-may also be the subject of legitimately different
interpretations in different political communities. For that reason, it may be
best not to completely standardize international criminal law and instead to
allow some room for diverging interpretations.
Assuming we do not necessarily want to standardize every facet of in-
ternational criminal law, what good can networks do? The answer,
paradoxically, is that in international criminal law, networks are more likely
to help preserve diversity than they are to destroy it. This is so because in
international criminal law, unlike securities, antitrust, and environmental
protection, the main alternative is centralized promulgation of the law
through international tribunals. Compared to these tribunals, which have
established international bureaucracies to apply the law in a uniform fash-
ion, networks are more likely to promote understandings of international
criminal law that reflect the views of affected countries.
Another possibility, of course, would be to enforce international crimi-
nal law entirely at the domestic level. This would, at least in theory, allow
the communities affected most directly by genocide and crimes against hu-
manity to deal with these crimes in a manner consistent with the
community's own moral and political judgment. National prosecutions have
other benefits too: They are generally more efficient and avoid some of the
enforcement problems that plague international prosecutions.
46
But prosecution at the domestic level has frequently been problematic
and is likely to continue to be so. International crimes are typically commit-
ted with the complicity or acquiescence of governments. Political pressure
on local judges or a lack of resources may prevent prosecutions from hap-
41. E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 38, art. 77; Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 23, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.
8, 1994).
42. See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 371 (1997).
43. E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 38, art. 63.
44. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
145-46 (2d ed. 2004).
45. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001,
at 193, 194; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 38, art. 8, para.
2(b)(iv); Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1st
Sess., pt. n(B), art. 8, para. 2(b)(iii), ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sep. 3-10, 2002). Other points of
disagreement in international criminal law cover the definitions and application of a number of core
principles, including command responsibility, superior orders, inhumane and degrading treatment,
and incitement to genocide. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 101-07.
46. Turner, supra note 39, at 14.
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pening at all or may lead to unfair results. 47 Even if the government impli-
cated in the crimes is no longer in power, the conflict that gave rise to the
crimes may have strained the resources of the state and created serious po-
litical divisions that risk inflaming the violence anew.
Indeed, more frequently than is commonly acknowledged, the failure to
prosecute international crimes at the domestic level is related more to lack
48of capacity than to sheer disregard of international law. During the last
decade, in many countries emerging from dictatorship or a violent conflict,
the new regime has sought to implement some form of transitional justice
measures as a way to break with the past. These measures have taken the
form of prosecutions, truth and reconciliation commissions, victim compen-
sation schemes, vetting procedures, and most recently, referrals to the
International Criminal Court.4 9 Where states have made a decision against
prosecutions, it is often due to recognition of their limited resources or their
political fragility.5 Rwanda's post-genocide experience shows that even a
country with a zeal to prosecute international crimes may have to settle for
less than a full legal reckoning.' In Iraq and Sierra Leone, too, the political
47. Id.
48. The recent growth of organizations such as the International Center for Transitional
Justice and the International Criminal Law Services Foundation, which provide advice and technical
assistance to national authorities interested in pursuing accountability for international crimes, at-
tests to the willingness of many governments to comply with international criminal law, as well as to
their limited capacity to do so. This finding is consistent with the insights of Abram and Antonia
Chayes' "managerial" theory of compliance, which states that noncompliance is at least as much a
result of lack of capacity as a lack of will to comply. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
4(1995).
49. E.g., TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMIS-
SION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (2003), http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/rep.pdf;
International Center for Transitional Justice, Burundi: ICTJ Activity, http://www.ictj.org/enl
where/regionl/512.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2006) (describing ongoing negotiations in Burundi
about the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a hybrid tribunal and noting
that there is "a great need for expert advice and comparative information" about these accountability
mechanisms); International Center for Transitional Justice, Guatemala: ICTJ Activity, http://
www.ictj.org/en/where/region2/518.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2006) (noting that upon the Guatema-
lan government's invitation, the Center is helping build Guatemala's capacity to prosecute
international crimes); International Criminal Court: Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2006) (describing cases referred for investigation by the
governments of the Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, the countries where the
crimes occurred).
50. See, e.g., International Center for Transitional Justice, Afghanistan: ICTJ Activity, http://
www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/507.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006) (describing ongoing discussions
about transitional justice mechanisms in Afghanistan and noting that, despite widespread popular
support for criminal accountability, prosecutions remain a controversial issue, "with many powerful
sectors lobbying against the plan" to begin such prosecutions). In Chile, Argentina, and Cambodia,
concerns about political stability resulted in a much-delayed domestic effort to address human rights
violations. See Jan McGirk, Justice Catches Up with the Khmer Rouge, INDEP. (London), May 5,
2006, at 29, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article362155.ece; Argentina
Holds "Dirty War" Trial, BBC NEWS, June 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/
5099028.stm; Human Rights Watch, Chile: Supreme Court Confirms Pinochet Indictment, http://
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/04/chile9943 txt.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
51. The UN set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to assist Rwanda in its
efforts to deal with international crimes committed during its civil war. The Tribunal, however, has
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will to prosecute exists, but both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Iraqi Special Tribunal depend heavily on foreign assistance to try perpetra-
tors of human rights violations. The recent voluntary referrals of cases to the
ICC by Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Congo also suggest a
lack of capacity to deal with domestic prosecutions for human rights viola-
tions-not only for financial reasons, but also for fear of destabilizing
domestic politics. 52 In brief, domestic governments are often nominally
committed to the notion of bringing perpetrators of human rights violations
to justice, but they perceive that the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits.
In these circumstances, networks can help promote and facilitate prose-
cutions of international crimes by reducing the costs and increasing the
benefits of taking that step at the national level. In particular, networks have
the ability to address two key problems of purely national prosecutions-
lack of resources and political frailty. They can do so first by offering tech-
nical assistance to rebuild judicial systems devastated by conflict. They can
serve as a constant source of ideas and information and help build domestic
enforcement capacity. Through their participation in a network, officials
from post-conflict states can learn from their counterparts in more stable
and developed legal systems about new models of legislation and strategies
of implementing international criminal law. While international criminal law
may not involve as many technical issues as, say, telecommunications or
securities regulation, there is still a bit of "science" in how one goes about• 53
prosecuting international crimes. Transferable lessons can relate to the role
of victims in the proceedings, witness protection, forensics of human rights
violations, and a range of other techniques of investigating complex sys-
54
temic crimes.
Aside from building up local capacity to prosecute crimes, networks can
lend political support to actors who aim to implement international criminal
law domestically. They can provide such local actors "with standards, ap-
proved by the international community, that strengthen efforts to promote
new values within domestic bureaucracies and among the public."" These
standards can be used to evaluate government behavior and "mobilize politi-
focused prosecutions on high-level figures, so Rwanda has had to pursue lower-level criminals do-
mestically. Because of the enormous numbers of alleged perpetrators of atrocities, the Rwandan
judicial system has had to rely heavily on plea bargaining and on informal communal gacaca courts
to process the cases more efficiently. Despite these efforts to speed up the process, estimates suggest
it may take another ten years to try all suspects.
52. For a discussion of the downsides of such voluntary referrals of cases to the ICC, see
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal
Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 392-94 (2005), and William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in
Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 557,567-68 (2005).
53. Telephone Interview with Marieke Wierda, Senior Assoc., Int'l Ctr. for Transitional
Justice (Feb. 15, 2006).
54. See id.
55. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 50, 70 (Eyal Benvenisti &
Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
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cal pressure when conduct falls short."56 And where networks take the form
of hybrid prosecutions and trials, the participation of international officials
alongside local prosecutors and judges can help minimize the danger of po-
litical interference with the legal process.
Intervention by networks into domestic affairs is less likely to be per-
ceived as an imposition of foreign norms than investigations and
prosecutions by a foreign or international tribunal. In part, this is because
networks involve local actors in a dialogue with their foreign counterparts.
The informality of network exchanges also contributes to their political ac-
ceptability. Networks operate through soft-law mechanisms-standards and
guidelines, rather than binding treaties-and these soft-law tools offer
greater flexibility to domestic actors.57 When domestic officials are uncertain
whether they can follow through on their international commitments-for
example, because of weak institutions or political opposition at home-they
will prefer soft-law mechanisms to international organizations or treaties.
58
As Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal explain, soft-law mechanisms allow local
actors to "test political reactions to [international commitments] and pre-
serve deniability if the responses are adverse."5 9 They also "provide[]
breathing space for supporters and relevant governmental agencies to organ-
ize for implementation" and to persuade skeptics.60
It must be recognized, however, that international criminal law networks
will not solve the problem of recalcitrant regimes that entirely reject the
legitimacy of international criminal law norms. Instead, networks can work
with and influence those regimes that are in principle convinced of the va-
lidity of these norms, but that perceive it as too difficult or politically
inconvenient to implement them in practice.
III. PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW NETWORKS
While the development of international criminal law networks may seem
normatively attractive for the reasons discussed in the previous Section, this
may not matter much if, in practice, these networks are not likely to come
into being. This Section therefore examines the forces that may propel ac-
tors at the domestic and supranational level to create and support
international criminal law networks.
When compared to violations of securities, antitrust, or environmental
laws, international crimes do not always create cross-border effects that
would prompt countries to cooperate at the global level. Crimes associated
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 69-70; see also Whitehead, supra note 30, at 701-02 (explaining how flexible,
non-binding standards issued by the Basel Committee, a banking regulation network, allowed Japan
to show commitment to the network norms, while lowering its compliance to adjust to the Asian
banking crisis).




with an armed conflict may produce a refugee crisis or embroil neighboring
countries in the conflict.6 But in most instances, these effects are regional,
rather than global, and they rarely affect the more powerful, developed
countries directly. Moreover, in contrast to regulatory problems like antitrust
violations or transnational crimes such as drug-trafficking and terrorism,
international crimes are usually one-time, overwhelming events, which may
not appear to require continuous transgovernmental coordination.
At the same time, the heinous nature of these crimes provokes unparal-
leled moral outrage. The outrage often compels developed countries to
intervene in some fashion, even when they are not materially affected by the
conflict. The intervention may occur during the conflict, in the form of a
peacekeeping or humanitarian aid mission. Or it may happen after the end
of the hostilities and include help with the prosecution of past atrocities and
the reestablishment of the rule of law. The reactions to the Sierra Leonean,
Rwandan, Yugoslav, and East Timorese conflicts, which led to the estab-
lishment of international or hybrid tribunals to prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity, are examples of this latter type of intervention. But
there are many instances in which moral outrage is not sufficient to prompt
significant action by the international community, and the response to the
61
atrocities is little more than symbolic condemnation. Whether and how the
global community responds depends in large part on the level of public
awareness and concern for human rights violations. This is where the next
factor-the involvement of non-governmental organizations--comes into
play.
Non-governmental organizations are often catalysts for global coopera-
tion in international criminal law. They report on situations giving rise to
international crimes, lobby governments and international organizations to
respond to these situations, and even become directly involved in managing
the response. 6' The active participation by NGOs in the negotiations of the
61. For example, the Rwandan genocide resulted in massive refugee flows to the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("DRC"). The conflict between the Hutu refugees and the Rwandan government
continued on Congolese territory and was one of the catalysts for the larger conflagration within the
Congo, which took on regional dimensions. E.g., U.N.: Congo War Could Result in Genocide, CNN,
Nov. 24, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9811/24/rwanda.congo/. For a discussion of the
more recent refugee flows and spillover of fighting from the Sudan to Chad, see Katharine Houreld,
Darfur Refugees Forced to Join the Fight, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 28, 2006, at 6, available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0428/pO6sO2-woeu.html.
62. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1667, 1680-81 (2003).
63. For example, many NGOs have launched campaigns to raise awareness and demand
action in response to the serious human rights violations in the Sudan. E.g., Amnesty International,
Make An Impact-Make Some Noise, http://noise.amnesty.org/site/c.adKlVNsEkG/b.1630807/
k.8DD9/Makean_Impact.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006); Human Rights First, Help Organize a
Peace Envoy for Darfur, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemational..justice/darfur/index.asp (last
visited Sep. 23, 2006); Human Rights Watch, Sudan: No Justice for Darfur Victims, http://
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/08/sudan 13516.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006). For a descrip-
tion of the various other ways in which NGOs have worked to shape norms and build transnational
coalitions, see, for example, KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6, at 79-198, and Mark A. Pollack &
Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical Perspective, in TRANS-
ATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 32.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is perhaps the best-known
example of their influence in the field of international criminal law. Non-
governmental organizations supplied delegations to the Rome Conference
with commentaries on the ICC draft statute, lobbied for provisions in the
statute, prompted reluctant governments to sign on to the project, and ulti-
mately saw many of their recommendations adopted by the delegations.
6
4
The negotiation of the ICC Statute was perhaps a culmination of NGO
efforts in international criminal law, but these organizations had been in-
volved long before then and have remained actively engaged since.
Transitional justice efforts in Sierra Leone and East Timor, for example,
have been greatly influenced by the work of non-governmental organiza-
tions such as Human Rights Watch, No Peace Without Justice, and the
International Center for Transitional Justice. 66 These NGOs and others con-
tinue to gather and disseminate information about developments in
international criminal law, and they keep these issues on the agenda of na-
tional governments. In countries emerging from conflict, NGOs are often
directly involved in transitional justice efforts by providing resources, help-
ing draft legislation, and training local authorities to investigate and
617prosecute international crimes. In countries that allow private parties to file
a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor, NGOs have used that op-
61portunity to press for international crimes prosecutions.
64. Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 183 (1997). At Rome,
NGOs garnered the power of face-to-face interaction that makes networks so effective. As one par-
ticipant in the Rome Conference reported:
Many of the delegates, and almost all of the Secretariat officials and key Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) representatives, knew each other personally or by reputation at the start
of the negotiations, remained in the negotiations through the diplomatic conference in Rome,
and are now at work in the PrepCom in New York. Knowledge of each other's styles, person-
alities, and abilities-both strengths and weaknesses-provided confidence, predictability and
mutual forbearance.
John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and In-
ternational Lawmaking in the 21st Century, II PACE INT'L L. REV. 361, 364 (1999). NGOs'
influence was also due to their expertise in the area-their representatives included former govern-
ment policymakers and academics who were familiar with many of the technical issues facing the
Rome negotiators, and many of the NGOs had long been operating in the field of human fights. See
Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the
Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 202 (2000).
65. Falk & Strauss, supra note 64, at 202 n.56 (citing Richard Falk, Telford Taylor and the
Legacy of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693, 716-21 (1999)).
66. Interview with Marieke Wierda, supra note 53; Email from Noah Novogrodsky, Dir.,
Int'l Human Rights Program, Univ. of Toronto Law Sch., (Feb. 13, 2006) (on file with author) (not-
ing that the recommendations by Human Rights Watch for the SCSL Statute were adopted almost in
their entirety and that groups like No Peace Without Justice and the International Crisis Group had a
strong role to play in the formation of the Special Court).
67. See, e.g., Interview with Marieke Wierda, supra note 53; International Center for Transi-
tional Justice, Mission and History, http://www.ictj.org/en/about/mission/ (last visited Sep. 23,
2006).
68. See, e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights, Legal Docket: International Human Rights,
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human-rights/human-rights.asp (last visited Sep. 23, 2006); Human
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NGOs can open up paths of cooperation not only between themselves
and government officials, but among government officials as well. By keep-
ing international crimes on the agenda of developed countries and by
establishing contact points in countries affected by conflict, they can pro-
vide the building blocks for more robust transgovernmental cooperation in
the field.
Despite their critical role in promoting cooperation in international69
criminal law, as well as in other areas of global concern, non-governmental
organizations feature only on the sidelines of the current academic discus-
sion about global government networks. This may be because they
complicate a model that is already difficult to keep conceptually tidy. For
instance, to explain how individual governmental officials interact with one
another, independently of their central governments, scholars must assess
the level of autonomy of these officials in their exchanges with one another.
It is difficult to determine empirically whether an official taking part in a
network acted in a certain manner as a result of her commitment to the net-
work, or whether she was dutifully following the orders of her central
government. If we add more layers of interaction by including non-
governmental organizations, it becomes even more challenging to decipher
whether a certain action of the network was the result of non-governmental
pressure or of the trust built up during the repeated interactions among gov-
ernment officials in the network.
NGOs are excluded from the discussion about networks for yet another
reason-they are perceived by some scholars to detract from the normative
appeal of the transgovernmental model. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example,
is concerned about the lack of accountability of private actors, and for this
reason, she does not include NGOs in her model of networks.7° This judg-
ment is contestable; in some undemocratic countries, NGOs may better
represent popular views on human rights than the government. But more
importantly, the exclusion of NGOs impoverishes the description of path-
ways of cooperation and influence in transnational networks. As the
previous paragraphs documented, in international criminal law, non-
governmental organizations have spearheaded many initiatives that may
later be taken over and transformed by transgovernmental networks. More-
over, as Slaughter herself acknowledges, NGOs can have a very positive
influence on the accountability of networks by monitoring the behavior of
officials within those networks and preventing them from acting in complete
disregard of the interests of the populations they represent.7
Rights Watch, The Case Against Hiss~ne Habr, http://hrw.org/justice/habre (last visited Sep. 23,
2006).
69. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6, at 79-198; Thomas Risse, Transnational Actors and
World Politics, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in BRINGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN 3, 11-13 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995).
70. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 9-10.
71. Id. at 11.
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In addition to NGOs, the International Criminal Court is likely to en-
courage transgovernmental cooperation. There are several reasons why the
court may find it advantageous to take that approach. First, the court has
scarce resources and limited political support, so it must rely on national
authorities to enforce its decisions, to help with investigations, and to prose-
cute crimes that the ICC cannot address on its own.7z Given that the ICC has
no independent enforcement powers, it is clear that national authorities will
be of essential assistance in collecting evidence, apprehending suspects, and
enforcing court judgments." As a policy paper of the Office of the Prosecu-
tor ("OTP") of the ICC explains:
The principle of complementarity represents the express will of States Par-
ties to create an institution that is global in scope while recognising the
primary responsibility of States themselves to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion. The principle is also based on considerations of efficiency and
effectiveness since States will generally have the best access to evidence
and witnesses. Moreover, there are limits on the number of prosecutions
the ICC can bring.74
Given these limitations on the court's mandate and resources, much of
the burden of international-crimes prosecutions will remain with national
authorities. But as discussed earlier, national authorities will sometimes lack
the capacity or the willingness to prosecute international crimes on their
own. Vertical networks,75 meaning closer contacts and collaboration between
ICC and national officials, could therefore be an essential tool in promoting
the domestic enforcement of international criminal law. In its statements, the
OTP has acknowledged the importance of this type of cooperation. It has
already pronounced that its outreach strategy will be to "develop a network
of relationships between the Prosecutor, national authorities, multi-lateral
institutions, [and] non-governmental organisations ... to ensure that in any
kind of situation in which the Prosecutor is called upon to act, practical re-
sources are made available to enable an investigation to be mounted. 76
In pursuing this strategy, the OTP has begun developing contacts with
national authorities charged with investigating and prosecuting war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide.7 7 It has also expressed its willing-
ness to provide information and other types of assistance to national
78
authorities. Where the ICC does not have the resources or the mandate to
72. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES
BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 3 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.intflibrary/organs/
otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
73. Turner, supra note 39, at 7-8.
74. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 72, at 4.
75. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 20-22 (defining vertical networks).
76. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 72, at 2.
77. Id. at 2, 5, 7.
78. See id. at 8; Interview with Rod Rastan, Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, in
The Hague, Neth. (July 13, 2006).
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provide assistance, it plans to put the relevant governments in contact with
other partners who can help them build up their prosecutorial capacity.7 9
Together with non-governmental organizations and state authorities, the
OTP is also a key participant in the Justice Rapid Response Initiative-a
program launched by national governments to help states that are willing but
not quite able to investigate and prosecute international crimes.8 s More ambi-
tiously, the OTP has proposed a strategy of dividing the labor of investigations
between national and international authorities and perhaps even conducting
proceedings in the region where the crimes were committed.8 Once such ver-
tical networks are established with the assistance of the ICC, they could lay
the ground for more regular horizontal contacts and relations among na-
tional investigators, prosecutors, and judges.
The ICC is also likely to serve as a catalyst for networks in quite a dif-
ferent way. The principle of complementarity will encourage some national
governments to undertake war crimes prosecutions so as to preempt action
against their nationals by the ICC. To avoid a finding by the ICC that they
are unable to prosecute international crimes adequately, states parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC have already begun adopting implementing legisla-
tion. 2 As this legislation is passed, special units are likely to be established
within national law enforcement and prosecution agencies to handle war
crimes cases. These units will therefore be at hand to participate in interna-
tional criminal law networks.
Collaboration is already occurring among state officials to combat
"transnational" crimes such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, and money laun-
dering.83 It is to be expected that such collaboration will expand to include
efforts to address international crimes. This has already begun to happen in
Europe, where several countries have established special prosecutors' offices
to deal with trans-border organized crime, as well as with war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 4 The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has also
79. Interview with Rod Rastan, supra note 78.
80. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
81. See INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, MR. LUIS MORENO OCAMPO, TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR
1593, at 7 (2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICCDarfurUNSC_Report_29-06-05_
EN.pdf; OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 72, at 5.
82. See CLAUS KRESS ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS, VOLUME
II: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, COOPERATION, AND ENFORCEMENT (2005).
83. See generally PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMI-
NALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006).
84. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001, at 1321 (2002), http://
wwwc.house.gov/intemational-relations/10778290d.pdf (reporting on the establishment of a new
Belgian federal prosecutor's office that will be responsible for prosecuting crimes such as human
and arms-trafficking, human rights violations, and terrorism); Danish Prosecution Service Special
International Crimes Office, http://www.sico.ankl.dk/page22.aspx (last visited Sep. 23, 2006); see
also Terry Carter, Playing by the Rule of Law, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 50, available at
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/redesign/lOfserb.html (reporting the establishment of a new "Special
Court" in Serbia, which includes a Special Chamber for War Crimes and a Special Chamber for
Organized Crimes); International Criminal Law Services Foundation, Latest Developments,
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broadened some of its technical assistance for efforts against transnational
crimes to include international crimes. The DOJ Office of Overseas Prose-
cutorial Development, Assistance and Training ("OPDAT") was established
with the primary mission of providing assistance to foreign nations so as to
equip "the U.S. with a stronger base of foreign cooperation in the fight
against organized crime, illegal narcotics, and terrorism."85 In the countries
of the former Yugoslavia, where organized crime and war crimes are closely
intertwined, OPDAT assistance has already been extended to cover prosecu-
816tion of war crimes as well.
These developments are not surprising. The skills required to investigate
and prosecute transnational and international crimes are similar, and it
makes sense, for the sake of efficiency, to entrust the same officials with
responsibility for both types of crimes. And when programs such as OPDAT
offer assistance to a post-conflict criminal justice system to address terror-
ism and organized crime, they help strengthen the system's overall
capacities and thus also support efforts to prosecute international crimes.
Furthermore, domestic law enforcement authorities and international
criminal courts' investigators are increasingly learning about the links be-
87
tween transnational and international crimes . It is hard to say whether this
is because the groups committing these crimes have started interacting
more frequently, or whether the connections are simply becoming clearer
to law enforcement and prosecuting authorities at this point. It may well
be that the greater scrutiny of war crimes and crimes against humanity
after the establishment of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals
has clarified pre-existing links between these crimes and cross-border or-
ganized crime. In some instances, international prosecutors may be
purposely emphasizing the connections to transnational crimes in order to
attract attention and resources to their own efforts. The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, for example, pointed to the links between Charles Taylor
and Al-Qaeda in the hope of drawing the attention of U.S. authorities,
which could provide more funding to the court and put more pressure on
Nigeria to surrender Taylor.88 While the connections to Al-Qaeda have not
http://www.icls-foundation.org (last visited Sep. 23, 2006) (reporting that the Chief Public Prosecu-
tor for the Norwegian National Authority for the Prosecution of Organised and Other Serious
Crimes has joined the network).
85. What Is the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
(OPDAT), http://www.thememoryhole.org/doj/opdat/opdat-mission.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006)
(providing mission statement for OPDAT that was previously on DOJ website).
86. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. RE-
CORD 2004-2005, at 125 (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
43226.pdf.
87. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNITED NATIONS, THE GLOBAL PROGRAMMES 7 (2003),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/cicp-global-programmes.pdf ("The connections be-
tween war and organized crime has [sic] become of increasing concern, specifically in Africa, South
Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America."); Interview with Rod Rastan, supra note 78.
88. See Chitra Ragavan & Julian E. Barnes, Africa's Most Wanted, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 16, 2005, at 26, 27; Telephone Interview with Peter Chaveas, Deputy Dir. & Diplomatic




been substantiated so far, there is evidence of Hezbollah ties in Sierra
89Leone. More recently, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has
highlighted the links between cross-border financial crimes and war crimes.
The Office of the Prosecutor has called on states to cooperate in the investiga-
tion of international crimes by providing information on the financial
transactions that fueled the commission of such crimes; in turn, the Office
has committed to offering to states whatever evidence it has of financial
crimes that can be prosecuted domestically.9
IV. EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW NETWORKS
Networks of war crimes investigators, prosecutors, and judges have in
fact begun to develop.9' Most such networks focus on tasks that can be cate-
gorized as "coordination and support." These include sharing information,
coordinating investigative and prosecutorial efforts, promulgating model
practices, and providing assistance to national authorities. Some networks
are even more formalized and integrate foreign officials directly into the
local judicial, prosecutorial, and investigative services on a temporary basis.
These "joint action" networks are becoming more common in international
criminal law, in the form of hybrid tribunals created to prosecute and adju-
dicate international crimes in post-conflict situations.
A. Coordination and Support Networks
In comparison to other areas, international criminal law is not an ex-
ceedingly complicated policy area that requires institutional coordination
across borders. There is no obvious need for rule harmonization. The basic
contours of the law are laid out in treaties,92 so they can easily be transposed
into national legislation and applied by domestic courts. Still, coordination
and support networks can play a very useful role in the enforcement of in-
ternational criminal law. States emerging from armed conflict often lack the
resources to develop and implement a prosecution strategy for international
crimes, which usually involve mass atrocity, governmental complicity, seri-
89. Interview with Peter Chaveas, supra note 88. But see GLOBAL WITNESS, FOR A FEW
DOLLAR$ MORE: How AL QAEDA MOVED INTO THE DIAMOND TRADE 24 (2003), http://
www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00091 .pdf.
90. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 72, at 2-3. To coordinate efforts in areas where
transnational and international crimes intersect, the Office has also established contacts with other
international and regional organizations, including Interpol, the EU Office of the High Representa-
tive for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Security Council Expert Panels on the
exploitation of natural resources and armed conflicts. Interview with Rod Rastan, supra note 78.
91. A network of parliamentarians is also in the process of being developed, in the form of a
Consultative Assembly of Parliamentarians for the International Criminal Court and the Rule of
Law, but because it is still at a very early stage, it is not included in the discussion. See CONSULTA-
TIVE ASSEMBLY OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR
GLOBAL ACTION, WELLINGTON RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRMINAL COURT (ICC),
MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2004), http://www.pgaction.org/
uploadedfiles/Wellington%2OFinal%2ODoc(2).pdf.
92. See supra note 38.
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ous security problems, and sometimes cross-border investigations. Networks
can be of assistance in helping states establish effective investigation and
prosecution strategies.
In particular, three sets of international criminal law networks have be-
gun developing to exercise these functions: a network of investigators of war
crimes, a prosecution network, and a global community of international-
crimes judges.
1. Investigative Networks
On the investigative side, vertical support networks are developing
through the international criminal tribunals and Interpol. These networks can
grow stronger and also serve as the starting points for greater horizontal con-
tacts among national officials charged with investigating war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide. A number of coordination and support net-
works have also formed to combat trans-border crime, and they can provide a
model for transgovemmental coordination in complex criminal matters.
Networks of investigators have developed at the supranational as well as
the transnational level. Investigators of the several international criminal tri-
bunals have begun cooperating with each other and exchanging information
and strategies. For example, when the International Criminal Court began its
first investigations in Uganda, Congo, and Sudan, it relied on effective prac-
tices identified by the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals before it.93
Interpol, a global conduit for the exchange of information among national
police forces, has also begun to focus some of its efforts on war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. It has assisted in the efforts of interna-
tional tribunals to track down war crimes suspects and has begun coordinating
the activities of national units specializing in investigating international
crimes.94 It has hosted several working group meetings to identify the needs of
these units and has committed to playing a larger role in assisting them
through the "increased use of Interpol databases, the preparation of a best
practice manual, and identification of points of contact in member coun-
tries."95 It has further signed a cooperation agreement with the International
Criminal Court, giving the court access to Interpol's databases.96
In addition to the relatively formalized network-building by the interna-
tional tribunals and Interpol, more decentralized exchanges are occurring
among the investigators themselves. Already two international associations of
93. See COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS ON "THE
CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE": REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 3-7 (2004),
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/colloquiumO4/reports/final-report.pdf (keynote by ICC Chief Prosecu-
tor Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo); see also JOINT DECLARATION ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF GOOD
PRACTICES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005), http://
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/registry/speeches/ArushaFeb05-08_En.pdf.
94. Interpol, Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, http://www.interpol.int/





war crimes investigators have been formed-the Institute for International
Criminal Investigations ("IICI") and the International Association of War
Crimes Investigators ("IAWCI"). The UCI is sponsored by several European
foreign ministries as well as by private donors, and it focuses primarily on
training and deployment of international-crimes investigators at scenes of war
crimes around the world.97 It has a close relationship with the international
war crimes tribunals,9 and it created a manual of investigative protocols that it
offered to the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court in
2002.99 The IAWCI, on the other hand, is above all a forum for investigators to
meet and exchange ideas and experiences; it emphasizes its role in creating
bonds and friendships among war crimes investigators, providing career net-
working opportunities, and making charitable contributions to areas in need of
war crimes investigative expertise.'t°
Domestic in its origin, but transnational in its operations, the Argentine
Forensic Anthropology Team is another organization that has fostered global
exchanges in the investigation of human rights violations. It offers training
and advisory assistance in human rights-related forensic science; promotes
national and international forensic standards; and disseminates information
relevant to the investigation of human rights violations.'0 '
These recent developments suggest that a global network of international-
crimes investigators is on the rise. Although many of the associations that
form part of it are non-governmental organizations, they are heavily supported
by governments and often include national war crimes investigators in their
ranks. If these networks were to be integrated more closely within national
war crimes units, they could facilitate the work of these units by exchanging
information and ideas with them and by offering training and technical assis-
tance. They would improve domestic capacity to fulfill international
commitments without imposing a uniform approach to war crimes investiga-
tions.
A possible model for the further development of transgovernmental net-
works among investigators is Europol. Created by the European Union in the
early 1990s, Europol relies on a 590-member staff in assisting national efforts
to combat transnational crime. °2 Assistance mostly takes the form of generat-
ing and exchanging information and ideas. Europol's officers produce and
make available to member states threat assessments, crime analyses, and op-
97. Institute for International Criminal Investigations, http://www.iici.info (last visited Sep.
23, 2006).
98. Institute for International Criminal Investigations, Events Page, http://www.iici.info/
events.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
99. Id.
100. Press Release, Int'l Ass'n of War Crimes Investigators, War Crimes Investigators Form
Association (June 5, 2004), available at http:llwww.emediawire.com/releases/2004/06/
prwebl3l175.htm.
101. Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, http://www.eaaf.org (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).




erational analyses based on information supplied by member states and third
parties." 3 The network also provides training and technical assistance to its
members" "o4
Though Europol has not been in existence for a long time, it is already
showing some results. After relying on its services in particular cases, local
police officers have increasingly become convinced of the usefulness of the
network.' 5 The number of requests for assistance that Europol receives has
been going up steadily since its creation.'0 Europol is particularly valued for
its ability to provide competent and comprehensive analysis of cross-border
crimes,' °7 to fashion multi-disciplinary approaches to law enforcement,' °8
and to help officers from different states to overcome language and cultural
barriers among them. 1°9
Similar law enforcement networks have even begun developing at the
sub-national level. Dissatisfied with the "slow and sometimes grudging"
way in which federal agencies transmit information, chiefs of police in the
United States recently announced the decision to create their own network
of terrorism-related information for their common use."0 In fact, the New
York City Police Department is "ahead of the curve": It has already estab-
lished such a network with police forces and intelligence agencies around
103. Id. Europol maintains a computerized system that allows the input, access, indexing, and
analysis of data under a strict framework for data protection. Id.; MARCEL-EUGtNE LEBEUF, ON
ORGANIZED CRIME AND POLICE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-LESSONS LEARNED: AN
INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR CYRILLE FIJNAUT 5 (2003), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps/reports/
fijnaut e.pdf ("Europol is a collection of liaison officers ... connected immediately, in one minute,
by telephone, fax, by e-mail with the operational forces in the member states.").
104. Jonathan Winer, The Growing Role of International Institutions in Counterterrorism and
Law Enforcement, http://www.cfr.org/publication/6585/growing-role-of-international
institutions in counterterrorism and law enforcement.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
105. LEBEUF, supra note 103, at 8-9. For example, the Netherlands relied on Europol when
investigating ecstasy drug-trafficking cases and found that the cooperation significantly reduced the
country's international communications burden. Id. at 9-10.
106. E.g., Jirgen Strobeck, Forward, Europol, Annual Report 2003, http://
www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=publar2003#FOREWORD (reporting a forty percent increase
in cases); Forward, Europol, Annual Report 2002, http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=
publar2002#DIRECTORS%20FOREWORD (reporting increases in requests by individual coun-
tries).
107. See Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the European Union Committee (Sub-Committee
F) (Oct. 27, 2004), in EUROPEAN UNION COMM., AFTER MADRID: THE EU's RESPONSE TO TERROR-
ISM, 2004-5, H.L. 53, at 65, 76, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld2004O5/ldselect/ldeucom/53/53.pdf [hereinafter AFTER MADRID] (examination of Assistant Com-
missioner David Veness, Metropolitan Police); Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the European
Union Committee (Sub-Committee F) (Dec. 8, 2004), in AFTER MADRID, supra, at 180, 185 (ex-
plaining that the value of Europol is more on the analytical side, whereas Interpol's added value is
mostly in data gathering).
108. Europol staff includes not only regular police, but also customs, immigration, border, and
financial police officers.
109. Law enforcement officers can address a request to their Europol National Unit in their
native language and receive the answer back in the same language.




the world and receives information from them independently of federal au-
thorities."'
These European and sub-national networks of law enforcement officers
can offer a useful blueprint for the future direction of transgovernmental
cooperation in investigating international crimes. Governments can simply
extend the mandate of transnational crimes units to cover war crimes and
crimes against humanity. As discussed earlier, the skills required to investi-
gate these types of crimes are transposable, and the concentration of efforts
into the same office makes sense, given the increasingly visible connections
between transnational and international crimes.
2. Prosecution Networks
Like investigators, prosecutors at the international criminal tribunals
have begun exchanging ideas about the best way to approach common chal-
lenges. These steps provide a strong basis for the formation of a global
network that would engage national prosecutors dealing with the same is-
sues.
Through the Colloquium of Prosecutors of International Tribunals, su-
pranational prosecutors from the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") meet annually to "discuss the challenges and
lessons learnt in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes"
and to formulate best practices." 2 Topics of discussion include "evidence
management, witness and protection management, gender crimes, operating
procedures, tracking and arrests, speeding up trials" and "political strategies
towards non-cooperating States."' " Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal began
its operation, investigators, prosecutors, and judges of the ICC and the
SCSL met with their counterparts at the IST to discuss prosecutorial and
trial management strategies, and more generally, the applicability of interna-
tional criminal law and procedure to the cases likely to come before the IST.
These types of interactions are strongly encouraged by non-
governmental organizations, the United Nations, and certain governments
that have shown special interest in international criminal justice. For exam-
ple, in 2005, the International Center for Transitional Justice, a New York-
based NGO, put together an international criminal law conference in South
Africa, assembling domestic and international war crimes prosecutors."
4
The goal was to exchange information about international crimes prosecu-
111. Id.
112. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Second Colloquium of Prosecutors of
International Tribunals held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, ICTR/INFO-9-2-439.EN (June 29, 2005),
available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2005/439.htm [hereinafter Second Collo-
quium]. The Prosecutors have also conducted joint training sessions. Press Release, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, The Office of the Prosecutor Completes Joint Advocacy Training Pro-
gramme), ICTR/INFO-9-2-465.EN (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISHI/
PRESSREL/2006/465.htm.
113. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Second Colloquium, supra note 112.
114. Interview with Marieke Wierda, supra note 53.
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tions and discuss opportunities for creating networks in the field."5 The Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has also
contributed to this network- and capacity-building process by developing,
together with NGOs and war crimes prosecutors, a "best practices" manual
for the prosecution of crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. ' '6 The manual addresses strategic issues, such as the factors
to be considered in selecting targets for prosecution; practical issues, such as
witness protection; and legal questions, such as the applicable law, trial
management, and procedural protections. ' 7 Finally, the recently created In-
ternational Criminal Law Services Foundation, a non-profit organization,
has begun offering international criminal law training and advice to inter-
ested national authorities and individuals.' 5 It has compiled a list of experts,
including investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys, who are
available to offer their services to counterparts across the world." 9 Some of
these experts have already advised officials at the recently established hy-
brid court in Cambodia.'
20
A small group of governments has supported such network-building ef-
forts very actively and has conceived an ambitious project, the Justice Rapid
Response Initiative ("JRRI"), which appears to be the beginning of a broad
international criminal law network of investigators, prosecutors, judges, and
NGO associates.12 The goal of the initiative is to enhance the ability of statesto bring to justice perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
115. Id.
116. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR
POST-CONFLICT STATES: PROSECUTION INITIATIVES, U.N. Doc. HRIPUB/06/4, U.N. Sales No.
06.XIV.8 (2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-
Prosecutions.en.pdf; Interview with Marieke Wierda, supra note 53.
117. OFFICEOFTHEU.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 7, 19,21.
118. Interview with Reinhold Gallmetzer, Founding Member, Int'l Criminal Law Servs.
Found., in The Hague, Neth. (July 18, 2006); International Criminal Law Services Foundation,
Services, http://www.icls-foundation.orglcontenuto/Service/index.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
119. International Criminal Law Services Foundation, People of ICLS, http://www.icls-
foundation.org/Contenuto/About/index.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006). The foundation provides
services including the following:
[A]dvise a defence counsel on the international criminal law as applied in a specific case be-
fore a hybrid court; advise a registrar and prosecutor on the practical aspects of protecting
witnesses in their jurisdiction; [or] train a country's senior judges on the law of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court as incorporated in domestic legislation ....
International Criminal Law Services Foundation, Services, http://www.icls-foundation.org/
contenuto/Service/index.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
120. International Criminal Law Services Foundation, Projects, http://www.icls-foundation.org/
contenuto/Project/index.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
121. These governments include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Also involved in the planning stages of the JRRI were
the EU Commission, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, and NGOs such as the Vera Institute for
Justice, International Center for Transitional Justice, Coalition for an ICC, Argentine Anthropologi-
cal Forensic Team, and International Institute for Criminal Investigations. INT'L CRIMINAL DEFENCE




genocide. 22 Upon request by the affected national authorities, JRRI would
quickly dispatch experts and offer other short-term assistance. 2 3 The scope
of the initiative is broad and covers all stages of the criminal process. This
includes evidence preservation, prosecution assistance, short-term training
of judges, and other infrastructural and training support. 24 The degree of
formality of the initiative is still being worked out. The most informal model
envisions JRRI serving as a simple mechanism to share information and
evaluate assistance needs. Another proposal suggests that the JRRI should
not only share information and provide assistance, but also coordinate train-
ing standards. Finally, some have recommended making the JRRI an even
more formal organization, with a Secretariat that would maintain a list of
experts, compile relevant information, set training standards, and coordinate
the training of JRRI participants. 2 Whatever form the JRRI takes, by estab-
lishing clear contact points and methods of cooperation among national
investigators, prosecutors, and judges, it has the potential to extend the
benefits of short-term technical assistance to a long-lasting partnership in
international criminal justice.
A possible model, and perhaps a building block, for budding interna-
tional crimes networks like the JRRI are the existing networks of
prosecutors dealing with terrorism, drug-trafficking and other cross-border
crimes. Such alliances already operate at both the regional and international
level. For example, in Latin America, the Symposium of Judges and Prose-
cutors of Latin America promotes the domestic enforcement of international
environmental law by exchanging experiences, training prosecutors and
judges in the field, and promoting public awareness on environmental is-126
sues. A more prominent regional network is Eurojust, a team of twenty-
five prosecutors and investigative judges that coordinates and supports in-
vestigations and prosecutions of cross-border crimes in EU member states. 
7
In 2003, only one year after it began operations, Eurojust handled about 300
cases. Its functions have ranged from coordinating searches in different
countries to facilitating police access to foreign bank accounts, to identify-
ing best practices in judicial cooperation across member states. One of
Eurojust's most important contributions has been to promote contacts
among prosecutors from different EU states and to foster trust and coordina-
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. SYMPOSIUM OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS OF LATIN AMERICA, ENVIRONMENTAL COM-
PLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PROCEEDINGS AND DECLARATION OF BUENOS AIRES 209-15 (Maria
Eugenia Di Paolo ed., 2003), available at http://www.farn.org.ar/docs/p38_en.pdf. The network was
created on the initiative of a group of international and national environmental law organizations.
127. Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 2 (EC), available at http:/I
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_063/l_06320020306en0001001 3.pdf.




tion among them.129 It has also provided training on questions of mutual le-
gal assistance and cross-border crime prosecutions. 30
A much more informal prosecutorial network is the International Asso-
ciation of Prosecutors ("lAP"), which promotes global cooperation among
prosecutors in investigating transnational crimes such as terrorism, organ-
ized crime, and money laundering. More specifically, it aims to foster good
relations among prosecution agencies, facilitate the exchange of information
and expertise, and help ensure speedy mutual assistance in cross-border
crime investigations. 3' To achieve these aims, the Association organizes
conferences and meetings and coordinates training and technical assistance
programs for prosecutors engaged in justice reform projects. 32 It also pub-
lishes manuals to address common issues facing prosecutors around the
world and to encourage prosecutions that meet a minimum standard of hu-
man rights.
33
Recently, the Association established contacts with the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC. 3 The two have begun working on a Memorandum of
Understanding, which will outline possibilities for more regular ex-
changes.'35 In that connection, the IAP Newsletter from February 2006
reports that the Office of the Prosecutor "has asked national prosecutors to
be on the lookout for legal developments in [their] jurisdictions that may be
appropriate for addition to the Legal Tools facility or otherwise relevant to
the work of the OTP-legislation, case law, official procedures, etc.' 36 The
IAP Newsletter further informed the members of the Association that "[t]he
OTP is developing programs of assistance and protection for victims of
129. EUROJUST, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 23 (2005), http://www.eurojust.eu.int/press-
releases/annual-reports/2004/AnnualReport_2004 _EN.pdf; Memorandum from Michael G. Ken-
nedy, President, European Union Police Coll., to the European Union Comm., House of Lords (Nov.
2, 2004), in AFTER MADRID, supra note 107, at 194, 196 (memorandum by Eurojust); Minutes of
Evidence Taken Before the European Union Committee (Sub-Committee F) (Nov. 17, 2004), in
AFTER MADRID, supra note 107, at 141 (memorandum by Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International
Relations and Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University
of St. Andrews).
130. EUROJUST, supra note 128, at 37-38.
131. International Association of Prosecutors, About the Association, http://
www.iap.nl.com/estab.htm (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
132. Id.
133. INT'L Ass'N OF PROSECUTORS, ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at 6 (2006), http://
www.iap.nl.com/iap-annual-report_2005_2006.pdf.
134. The OTP of the ICC is now an organizational member of the lAP. International Associa-
tion of Prosecutors, New Organisational Members, http://www.iap.nl.com/sevenews/34.html#8 (last
visited Sep. 23, 2006). The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, will also address the 2006 An-
nual Conference of TAP, alongside the President of Eurojust, Michael Kennedy. International
Association of Prosecutors, I Ith lAP Annual Conference-Paris 2006, http://www.iap.nl.com/
sevenews/34.htmil#l (last visited Sep. 23, 2006). Such contacts are easily facilitated by the locations
of these networks-all three are based in The Hague, and the ICC and Eurojust share the same
building.
135. International Association of Prosecutors, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, http://




crimes and would welcome contact from practitioners with experience in
this area."''
Prosecutorial networks also form at the sub-national level. In the United
States, attorneys general of different states have formed an alliance to pool
their resources in the fight against crimes with federal or trans-border di-
mensions. The National Association of Attorneys General created the
Executive Working Group on Prosecutorial Relations to coordinate state
efforts in the fight against terrorism, cybercrime, and civil rights and hate
crimes.'38 The formation of networks at the sub-national level can be inter-
preted as yet another sign of the usefulness of coordination in the efforts to
prosecute complex crime.
The prosecutorial alliances that have formed to deal with trans-border
crime can provide a useful model of how to organize cooperation in the
prosecution of serious human rights violations. Their experience can point
to areas in which transnational cooperation adds real value to domestic
prosecutions. Some of the functions they already exercise-for example,
facilitating asset tracking and mutual legal assistance--can be used in inter-
national crimes prosecutions as well. In addition to offering a model of
organization, these networks can serve as the starting point for closer coop-
eration among international crimes prosecutors from different countries.
They can help identify contacts within national prosecutorial offices that
have experience with complex trans-border crimes. More ambitiously, the
mandate of these networks can be extended to include international crimes,
because, as discussed earlier, the prosecution of international and transna-
tional crimes requires similar skills and the concentration of these efforts
within the same teams is likely to be more efficient.
In addition to providing technical assistance, such networks can play an
important role in shaping prosecutorial norms around the globe. The publi-
cation of guidelines such as the IAP's Human Rights Manual represents a
step in that direction. The ICC is considering developing similar prosecuto-
rial standards and manuals, which it would offer as a guide to national
authorities undertaking international-crimes prosecutions. 9 At conferences
and training sessions, these networks can further strengthen a sense of
common identity among their members and spread a commitment to shared
objectives. It may not be long before networks begin to influence decisions
concerning whether and how to prosecute international crimes.
137. Id.
138. The Association provides training and technical assistance on some of these issues and
coordinates prosecution strategies not only among state prosecutors, but also between state and
federal agencies. National Association of Attorneys General, About NAAG,
http://www.naag.org/naag/about-naag.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006); National Association of
Attorneys General, NAAG Projects: Civil Rights, http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-civil-rights.php
(last visited Sep. 23, 2006); National Association of Attorneys General, NAAG Projects: Criminal
Law, http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-criminal-law.php (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
139. Interview with William Burke-White, Visiting Professor, Jurisdiction, Complementarity,
and Cooperation Div., Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, in The Hague, Neth. (July 13,
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Unlike investigators and prosecutors, judges have been somewhat less
active in institutionalizing their transnational contacts. There are a few ex-
ceptions, but they occur in areas other than international criminal law. As
mentioned above, the Symposium of Judges and Prosecutors in Latin Amer-
ica is a network of judges and prosecutors that exchanges information and
ideas to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law.' 40 A Global
Judges Symposium with the same goals and strategies was organized
through the efforts of the UN Environmental Programme and the Interna-
tional Network on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement. 4 At the
European level, the European Judicial Network provides a point for coordi-
nating mutual assistance in criminal matters. But these networks are very
loose and have a fairly narrow mandate. They are not as institutionalized as,
say, the Conferences of State Trial and Appellate Judges within the Ameri-
can Bar Association, which represent U.S. state judges' interests on issues of
common concern, sponsor education initiatives, and promulgate standards
for common practice questions, such as jury management and discovery
practice.
Most transgovernmental "networking" among national and supranational
judges occurs in less formal ways. These include personal exchanges during
joint meetings and conferences and a dialogue set out in legal opinions.
Judges from the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR have become actively involved in
meetings and training sessions with their counterparts from Iraq, Indonesia,
the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and elsewhere. 42 These meetings provide
a way to exchange information, but also to forge a common identity as in-
ternational criminal law judges.
Exchanges among the judges continue beyond these joint conferences.
Some judges carry lessons learned at international tribunals back to their
domestic courts. Many also pursue their dialogue through decisions, law
review articles, and public speeches. 43 As Anne-Marie Slaughter has ob-
served, we are witnessing a rise of a community of courts in which judges
140. Supra note 126 and accompanying text. Another Latin American network of judges
works to promote legal reform, democratization, and human rights in the region. Instituto de Estu-
dios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales, Red Centroamericana de Jueces, Fiscales y
Defensores por la Democratizacion de la Justicia [Central American Network of Judges, Public
Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys for the Democratization of Justice], http://
www.inecip.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=56 (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
141. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 66 (observing that the symposium brought together judges
from over eighty countries to discuss improving the adoption and implementation of environmental
laws).
142. INDONESIAN JUDGES SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2003), http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/seminar-indonesia.pdf;
Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast
the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2006); Interview with Reinhold Gallmetzer, supra
note 118.
143. See Danner, supra note 142, at 57-58.
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are increasingly referring to each other's opinions not because these opin-
ions are binding authority, but because of their persuasive reasoning.
The transnational judicial dialogue touches on a number of sensitive po-
litical and moral questions. For example, courts are engaged in
conversations about issues such as the death penalty, which reflect commu-
nity understandings of appropriate punishment and give rise to different
interpretations across the world. 45 As a result of the rise of universal juris-
diction and the creation of international criminal tribunals, national and
international courts are also increasingly referring to one another's opinions
on questions of international criminal law.' 46
This dialogue need not necessarily lead to convergence. Slaughter sug-
gests that "judges do not shy from arguing with one another, even
acrimoniously" and they "acknowledge the validity of a wide variety of dif-
ferent approaches to the same legal problem"-a process she calls "positive
conflict."'4 17 So an important benefit of these less formal judicial networks is
that they accommodate legitimate diversity of opinion, even as they ex-
change useful ideas and information on how to implement international
norms domestically.
Though such a conversation through legal opinions is undoubtedly fruit-
ful, it may be somewhat one-sided. For example, in universal-jurisdiction
opinions about war crimes and crimes against humanity, courts rely mostly
on decisions by supranational tribunals or European courts. They rarely re-
fer to judgments by non-European courts dealing with international crimes
(for example, decisions of the courts of Rwanda, Ethiopia, or East Timor).
4
8
Judicial opinions from developing countries are not readily available for use
and not widely sought out by European and American courts. And at least in
American courts, there is significant political resistance-and arguably a
constitutional hindrance-to using any foreign opinions, especially on con-
stitutional matters. 49 For these reasons, the conversation with U.S. courts
and others similarly constrained by their political and constitutional envi-
ronment is likely to be quite unidirectional.
144. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 69.
145. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEo. L.J. 487, 505-29 (2005); see also
Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Com-
monwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1868-
84 (2002).
146. See Danner, supra note 142, at 57-58; William W. Burke-White, A Community of
Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MiC-i. J. INT'L L. 1, 63-
65, 95-97 (2002).
147. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 68.
148. Cf Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with De-
mocratic Principles, 92 GEo. L.J. 1057, 1068 (2004) ("[T]he key British decision judging Pinochet
extraditable to Spain to face torture charges cites decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, the European Commission of Human Rights, and courts of countries ranging
from the United States to Germany and Israel." (citations omitted)).
149. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); American
Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. (2005).
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The danger of this one-sidedness of networks is a valid concern, but two
points are worth noting in response. First, just because a judge refuses to
rely on foreign opinions as authority in certain domestic law matters does
not mean that she is hostile to all transnational exchanges. She may still be
open to sharing views and information with her foreign colleagues in the
context of face-to-face meetings.50 And such live dialogue can itself social-
ize judges to be more open to considering foreign opinions and international
law.
The second point is that even if networks are often one-sided, they can
still make a significant contribution to the enforcement of international
criminal law. In particular, the export of "rule of law" norms from more
powerful network members such as the United States can have an empower-
ing effect on some judges in countries in transition. Judges in countries
emerging from conflict can use opinions from foreign courts to support their
independent interpretations of human rights and humanitarian law in the
face of undue political pressure by local authorities.
In brief, a more formal international association of judges working on
war crimes and human rights cases, akin to the network of investigators and
prosecutors discussed in the previous sections, would be a step forward in
the development and enforcement of international criminal law. During
regular face-to-face meetings and other interactions, judges could learn bet-
ter to understand one another and their respective legal systems, ultimately
producing a more informed jurisprudence of international criminal law.
B. Joint Action Networks
Whereas coordination networks involve more informal, ad hoc contacts
among their participants, "joint action" networks engage participants daily
in face-to-face joint activities-investigation, prosecution, or adjudication-
for a sustained period of time. Joint action networks develop more rarely
than coordination and support networks, as they require greater institution-
alization and are generally more intrusive upon state sovereignty. But they
are useful in situations in which states suffer a serious lack of capacity to
prosecute and try international crimes, as is the case in many post-conflict
situations. In these cases, coordination and technical assistance may not be
sufficient. The actual presence of network participants in the territory where
the crimes were committed and where the law will be enforced may be nec-
151
essary.
150. See Chief Justice William Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks of the Chief Justice
at the Twentieth Anniversary Judicial Conference at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-04-08-
02a.html, cited in SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 66.
151. Joint action networks have arisen, for example, when a national government temporarily
assigns (seconds) its personnel to work within a foreign government. An example of such a network
can be found in Sierra Leone, where, as part of international assistance for post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, the British government appointed British officers to train and advise the local military and
police. As Human Rights Watch has reported:
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The most prominent joint action initiatives are the hybrid courts estab-
lished to try international crimes in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and
more recently, Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 2 Hybrid or mixed
tribunals operate in the country where the crimes took place, but are staffed
by both local and international investigators, prosecutors, and judges. The
international community, typically under the UN's auspices, is heavily in-
volved in both the creation and financing of the tribunals. 5 3 While the UN
usually plays a significant role in the design of these tribunals, they are not
meant to be a one-size-fits-all solution. They are created with the needs of
the affected state in mind, and their statutes usually include domestic crimi-
nal law and procedure alongside international laws. s4 The drafting of a
hybrid tribunal's statute often involves long deliberations between the inter-
national community and domestic authorities and civil society.'55 These
deliberations may diminish the speed and efficiency with which the court is
created, but they increase its political legitimacy.5 6 The availability of local
prosecutors and judges on the hybrid courts also means that decision-makers
on these courts are more likely to respect and understand local customs and
conditions than are officials from international criminal tribunals. 57
The transgovernmental nature of hybrid courts is therefore not in doubt.
But are they "networks"? Although hybrid courts may seem too institution-
alized to fit the definition,158 they fulfill some of the same functions as
U.K. military personnel continued to play a major role in advising and directing military op-
erations, including the staffing of key positions within the Sierra Leone defense headquarters.
In coordination with the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.K. also provided officers and funds
for training and administration of the Sierra Leone Police, including the secondment of a Brit-
ish officer as inspector general.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: EVENTS OF 2002, at 73 (2003), http://
www.hrw.org/wr2k3/pdf/sierraleone.pdf; see also Jamie O'Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity:
How To End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American
Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 223 (2004). Hybrid courts, discussed in the rest of this
Section, also fit the definition of a joint network. For a general overview of hybrid courts and their
functions, see Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003);
Turner, supra note 39, at 30-44.
152. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2006), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ijO206/ijO206web.pdf; Dickin-
son, supra note 151, at 295-300; Turner, supra note 39, at 36-44.
153. Turner, supra note 39, at 37.
154. Id. at 38; see also Dickinson, supra note 151, at 294-300.
155. See Turner, supra note 39, at 37-38.
156. See id.
157. E.g., Burke-White, supra note 146, at 63-64 (reporting that the East Timorese judge on
the East Timor panels explained to her Italian colleague a claim of mitigating circumstances based
on an East Timorese belief in "black magic").
158. At the same time, recent proposals for hybrid prosecutions seem even less formalized
than the Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor courts. See, e.g., Editorial, U.N. Help for Crime in
Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A28; Kim Ghattas, Lebanon's Groundbreaking Trial, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4926536.stm. The Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal ("IST"), created to try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Baathist
regime, relies on non-Iraqi jurists as advisors to the Iraqi judges and prosecutors. Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal art. 1(b), 6(b), June 23, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231, 231, 233 (2004). The IST Statute also
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transgovernmental networks and lack many of the trappings of permanent
supranational institutions. They exist on a temporary basis,"' and like other
networks, they initiate daily dialogue among judges and prosecutors from
different countries about the application of international criminal law to
domestic cases.160
Hybrid courts may be more likely than other, less formal networks to
harmonize the application of international criminal law. In a hybrid court,
the international and national judges have to come to a compromise in de-
ciding a particular case. By contrast, such consensus is not required in the
more informal transnational judicial dialogue. "Positive conflict" can be the
dominant mode of operation in the latter case, because national judges and
prosecutors ultimately decide for themselves how to implement interna-
tional law in a particular case.1
6
1
Even if hybrid courts do encourage a convergence of opinions on inter-
national criminal law, they do so after deliberation between national and
international judges about the substance and application of the law. While in
less formal networks, the views of judges from developed countries may
predominate, hybrid courts are certain to give voice to the perspectives of
judges from countries emerging from conflicts-views that are otherwise
underrepresented in the international legal community. Especially if local
judges have a majority on a hybrid court, their perspectives might be re-
flected more frequently in the development of international criminal law.
Hybrid tribunals enable prosecutors and judges from countries emerging
from conflict both to shape the law that applies to their own community 
6
2
and to influence the future development of international criminal law. The
tribunals are created on a temporary basis, so the foreign judges and prose-
cutors who work in them eventually go back to their own countries or move
on to new hybrid or international criminal tribunals. In the process, they are
likely to spread the insights they learned from their colleagues on the hybrid
courts and to carry forward the transnational dialogue about international
criminal law.163 There is yet another reason why hybrid courts' decisions are
permits the Iraqi Governing Council to appoint foreign judges to serve alongside their Iraqi counter-
parts, but the Council has not done so. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 4(d), June 23, 2003,
43 I.L.M. 231,232 (2004).
159. See Dickinson, supra note 151, at 310.
160. See id. at 306.
161. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 68.
162. This is so not only because the local employees of the court will apply their experience
in subsequent domestic cases, but also because hybrid court officials interact directly with the local
legal community during their operation. For example, the Office of the Prosecutor of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone undertook special outreach efforts that included training of local NGOs,
delivering lectures at local universities, and buttressing legal reform efforts. INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE, THE "LEGACY" OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 6-7 (2003),
http://www.ictj.com/downloads/LegacyReport.pdf.
163. Burke-White, supra note 146, at 64-65. Burundian Judge Ntukamazina, who served on
the East Timor Special Panels, observed the following about his East Timorese colleague:
"Judge Maria and I discuss things together. I am helping her to understand and interpret inter-
national law .... Judge Maria knows Indonesian law and I have learned about that. And I have
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more likely to be followed than purely domestic decisions of a developing
country. Their decisions are more likely to be available electronically, to be
translated, and to be discussed by international-law commentators in law
journals and treatises.' 6'
Until now, hybrid investigations, prosecutions, and trials have convened
national officials and judges from different countries. But as I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, it is entirely possible that in the future, hybrid courts may
also combine national judges and prosecutors with their counterparts from
the International Criminal Court. 65 This model would be consistent with the
mandate of the ICC, and a version of it has recently been contemplated for
prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Sudan.' 66
V. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW NETWORKS
While transgovernmental networks can have many beneficial effects,
there are also potential downsides. The primary challenges to the develop-
ment of networks are the potential for inconsistent application of the law, a
lack of transparency and accountability, and dominance of the networks'
agenda by a few powerful countries.
A. Inconsistent Application of the Law
The informal structure of networks, which provides them the needed
flexibility and openness to local views on international criminal law, creates• 167
the risk of inconsistency in applying the law. The more malleable and dis-
cretionary the rules and practices that networks establish, the more likely it
is that interpretation and enforcement of international criminal law will dif-
fer from country to country. At some point, this variation could undermine
learned about transitional situations, something that will make my job at home in Burundi eas-
ier as some similar crimes were committed there and now I think they could qualify as crimes
against humanity and genocide."
Id. (quoting Sylver Ntukamazina, Judge, Dili Special Panels); see also id. at 84 (observing that trial
and error in creating hybrid courts and the lessons learned from the process helped the international
community create a better hybrid court in Sierra Leone).
164. For example, the International and Comparative Law Quarterly and the Journal of In-
ternational Criminal Justice have published updates on the case law of the East Timor and Sierra
Leone tribunals. See, e.g., Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts:
East 7imor-Justice Denied, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 910 (2004); Robert Cryer, A "Special Court"
for Sierra Leone?, in Current Developments: Public International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
420, 435-46 (2001).
165. Turner, supra note 39, at 35-46.
166. Rosanna Lipscomb, Note, Restructuring the ICC Framework To Advance Transitional
Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 206 (2006); see also
INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 81, at 7.
167. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 30, at 719.
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the effectiveness of networks in promoting coordination, cooperation, and
compliance with international norms.168
This critique of networks may overvalue somewhat the need for consis-
tency in the way international law is interpreted and enforced. A measure of
variation is an important element of the local legitimacy of international
law.'69 If national authorities have all the relevant information about alterna-
tive approaches to applying international law, yet they choose not to follow
these approaches, this may well be a valid choice, driven by "the uniqueness
of... national traditions or the intensity of... political preferences.' °7 0 For
example, in international criminal law, such legitimate choices may include
applying the death penalty to crimes against humanity and genocide,1
7
1
prosecuting juvenile offenders, or allowing trials in absentia. These
choices might be politically legitimate if they reflect the preferences of the
groups most affected by them.
The openness of networks to such diversity might also spur innovation
in the development of international criminal law. Decentralized decision-
making can help solve problems that actors would be unlikely to address
successfully on their own, without exchanging ideas and information with
one another. 74
But at some point, divergence from international rules in order to
accommodate local preferences may defeat the object and purpose of an
international rule. Over time, it may undermine the predictability and
legitimacy of international law and of efforts by networks to enforce it. 75 It
is therefore important to think about legal structures that can adequately
168. In addition, members reluctant to enforce international law may comply with some of
their network commitments only nominally, so as to avoid being shunned from the network. But
ultimately, their actions may conflict with core principles of international law. For example, even
prosecutors and judges who have been advised and trained in human rights standards by their for-
eign peers may stage sham international prosecutions that fail to comply with minimal standards of
due process. Such actions could place in question the effectiveness of networks in promoting com-
pliance with international law.
169. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 31 (2006).
170. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 182.
171. E.g., Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 747, 748 (2005).
172. E.g., Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile
Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 167, 167 (2001).
173. E.g., SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 145-46. Provisions for trials in absentia have recently
ignited some controversy with respect to the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers. See Goran
Sluiter, Due Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 314, 320-21 (2006).
174. See Charles F Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture
of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 7 (June 13, 2006), available at http:/
www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/EU%20governance%20paper%20060406.pdf (discussing how
local units of regulators within the European Union learn from interacting with one another in a
"deliberative polyarchy").
175. See supra note 168.
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distinguish between diversity that is salutary and divergence that
impermissibly undermines international law.
Examples are available from federal, regional, and international legal
systems that have already faced a similar tension." Three principles devel-
oped at the supranational level may be especially helpful to network
participants as they decide what variations from network standards are ac-
ceptable. These are complementarity, margin of appreciation, and
subsidiarity.
Complementarity is a provision of the Rome Statute, which regulates
when the ICC ought to defer to national authorities. The Statute provides
that the court can take up a case only when a state with jurisdiction is un-
willing or unable to prosecute. 77 Article 17 further specifies that a state may
be found unwilling to prosecute when: 1) proceedings are undertaken "for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility";
2) there is an unjustified delay in the proceedings, which is "inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice"; or 3) the proceedings
are not "conducted independently or impartially," and they are conducted in a
manner that is "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to jus-
tice."'78 A state may be considered unable to prosecute when "due to a total
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testi-
mony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.' 79 These standards
may also serve as a useful guide to international criminal law networks. 8 ° If
government officials who take part in an international criminal law network
are unfairly shielding war criminals from prosecutions, network participants
may decide to suspend cooperation with these officials.
In Europe, the principles of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation
similarly help balance a respect for local preferences against a need for
common regulation at the European level. Under the doctrine of margin of
appreciation, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") gives state
signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights some leeway in
176. In the United States, courts created doctrines of incorporation to decide how the Bill of
Rights ought to be applied to states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Un-
der the doctrine of selective incorporation, a right that is an integral component of the American
criminal justice system will be applied to states to the same extent as it applies at the federal level.
Under the fundamental fairness approach, which was used for several decades but ultimately re-
jected, a right would be applied to states if, in a particular case, the right is essential to ensuring
fundamental fairness. See id. Extradition law principles also have developed at the national and
international level to help courts from one jurisdiction determine when to cooperate with other judi-
cial systems in criminal matters and when to resist such cooperation in order to prevent a severe
violation of rights. E.g., Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990), amended by G.A. Res. 52/88, arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (Dec. 12,
1997).
177. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 38, art. 17.
178. Id. art. 17, para. 2.
179. Id. art. 17, para. 3.




interpreting and applying the Convention. 8' In deciding how wide a margin
of appreciation to grant a government whose policy has been challenged
under the Convention, the ECHR looks to the degree of consensus among
the laws of signatory states with respect to that policy.182 The less consensus
there is, the more likely the court is to accept local variation in implement-
ing the Convention.' For example, in a recent case concerning the
interpretation of the right to life under the European Convention, the court
held that "in the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and
legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life
begins comes within the margin of appreciation" of each signatory state.1
8 4
The doctrine of subsidiarity, developed by the European Court of Justice
in the context of the European Union, demands that decisions be taken at a
supranational level "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by [national authorities]."'8 ' It urges
members of the EU to take action as close to the citizen as possible and to
act at the supranational level only when this would add some value over and
above what would be accomplished at the member state level. 86 The Euro-
pean Commission has been reviewing all proposed EU legislation for its
conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, and it has increasingly under-
taken consultations with affected national and sub-national constituencies to
ensure such conformity. 87
181. See Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1961) ("[A] government's dis-
charge of [its] responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and
of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest... ").
182. E.g., Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supra-
national Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316-17 (1997).
183. See id.; see also Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 927 (2005).
184. Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, [2006] EHCR 6339/05 (Lexis), 46 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Mar. 7, 2006).
185. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 42,
art. 5; George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community
and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 334 (1994).
186. In particular, the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality, which is now annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, establishes
the following guidelines to determine whether Community action is justified:
[1] the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regu-
lated by action by Member States; [2] actions by Member States alone or lack of Community
action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion
of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohe-
sion) or would otherwise significantly damage Member States' interests; [3] action at
Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with
action at the level of the Member States.
Protocol on the Application of Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 5, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 105, 106.
187. See Commission of the European Communities, Better Lawmaking 2005: Pursuant to
Article 9 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
COM (2006) 289 final (Jun. 13, 2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2006/com2006_0289en01.pdf. Despite following these procedures to ensure conformity with
subsidiarity, the Commission has been criticized for viewing subsidiarity "as a nuisance or even as
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International criminal network participants ought to examine their own
actions with reference to these principles. If they do not, it is likely that
other actors, including domestic legislatures and NGOs, will subject them to
similar scrutiny. 8 In deciding whether action is necessary at the transna-
tional level, network members should first examine whether their work adds
any value to action at the state level. This is a question that has already
arisen for transnational crime networks such as Europol. In a recent hearing
before the U.K. House of Lords, Europol came under scrutiny as to whether
it added any real value to national law enforcement efforts, or whether in-
stead it burdened them by requiring domestic police forces to share
information with foreign counterparts.189 This is the kind of analysis that
networks themselves ought to perform before taking action that might some-
times be better handled by national authorities.
Networks may also need to rely on a margin of appreciation analysis to
resolve conflicts among some of their members. 9 This need arises, for ex-
ample, when a participant is implementing a network standard in a way that
conflicts with the understanding of the standard by a majority of the net-
work's members. In that case, the members acting jointly may have to
decide if the divergence fundamentally undermines the goals of the network
or is a deviation based on a legitimate difference in values and needs. To do
so, they can apply the margin of appreciation standard, which inquires
whether the diverging member's interpretation is at odds with a well-formed
consensus among the rest of the network members. If it is, then the network
can attempt to persuade the deviating member to comply. 9 ' When persua-
sion does not help, the network can apply a range of soft-law sanctions,
including shaming, suspending technical assistance, and in the end, even
excluding the transgressing member from the network.
92
When it comes to the work of more formal, joint action networks, we
can imagine a judicial body applying the three doctrines discussed above.
For example, hybrid courts can be overseen by the ICC Appeals Chamber.
The Chamber could demarcate the boundaries between international law
an obstacle" to its ability to carry out legislative functions and for failing to explore subsidiarity
problems "in a substantive fashion." Florian Sander, Subsidiarity Infringements Before the European
Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism?, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 517, 543 (2006).
188. It is unlikely that an international court will have jurisdiction over the actions of most
networks, because they are not generally created by treaty and are not considered formal subjects of
international law. But see infra note 194 and accompanying text.
189. See Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the European Union Committee (Sub-Committee
F) (Dec. 8, 2004), in AFTER MADRID, supra note 107, at 180, 185 (examination of David Makinson,
Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group); Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the European
Union Committee (Sub-Committee F) (Oct. 27, 2004), in AFTER MADRID, supra note 107, at 65, 76
(examination of Assistant Commissioner David Veness, Metropolitan Police).
190. Cf Shany, supra note 183 (suggesting that the doctrine of margin of appreciation can and
should be used more broadly in international law).
191. The margin of appreciation standard can therefore usefully be used in conjunction with
the complementarity inquiry discussed earlier.
192. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 196-200.
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norms from which no deviation is acceptable and norms that are open to
diverse interpretations at the domestic level. 93 Relying on a central body to
resolve differences over the application of the law governing a network is
not unprecedented-some European Union transgovernmental networks are
subject to such supervision by the European Court of Justice and European
Commission. 9
B. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The informality of networks may not only lead to inconsistency, but also
render networks politically unaccountable.' 95 As mentioned earlier, network
participants are generally expected to represent national interests faithfully.
Their primary loyalty is to a national agency, court, or legislative body, and
their primary duties are closely tied up with national objectives. Even as
they attend international conferences, exchange information, or otherwise
interact with their partners across borders, they remain national representa-
tives. They negotiate for international standards that would not interfere
unduly with their national interests, and they may refuse to enforce a net-
work decision if that decision conflicts with important domestic policy
priorities. At the same time, through repeated interaction and dialogue, par-
ticipants manage sometimes to overcome parochial interests and adopt a
common position with their network peers. But a decision that promotes
global interests might not always reflect the preferences of their domestic
constituency. To the extent that network participants act against local inter-
ests, the democratic accountability of networks may suffer.'96 In the process
of socialization, networks may become little more than "a global bourgeoi-
"'197sie with a set of similar elite-class views ....
Imagine, for example, that as a result of their socialization in a transna-
tional network, war crimes investigators from a country emerging from
conflict begin to apply evidence-gathering protocols that protect the rights
of witnesses too scrupulously, at the expense of efficiency and sometimes
even defendants' rights. If the choice were presented to the country's repre-
sentative branches, they might vote against it. But if the agreement on the
change of standards occurred at the transnational level, away from the gaze
of the local media and public, representative domestic institutions might not
even learn about it.
193. Turner, supra note 39, at 41,
194. Bignami, supra note 11, at 824.
195. This charge has been leveled especially at regulatory networks, where the perception has
been that regulators operate too independently of central national authorities and do not adequately
take into account domestic perspectives and preferences. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 221-24; see
also W. Bruggeman, Policing and Accountability in a Dynamic European Context, 12 POLICING &
Soc'y 259, 272 (2002).
196. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Govern-
ance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1295-96 (2005) (reviewing
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004)).
197. Id. at 1272.
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A similar lack of transparency and accountability may delegitimize the
work of other regulatory networks as well. For example, there is concern
that intelligence agents acquiesce to tactics by their peers from other coun-
tries-for example, the use of extraordinary renditions and secret detention
centers-which may not be approved by their national, democratically
elected representatives. A recent inquiry by the German Parliament into the
CIA's kidnapping of a German citizen suspected of terrorism revealed that a
lower-level German intelligence official was informed of the suspect's sei-
zure, but did not relate this fact to his higher-ups."" The failure of the lower-
level German official to inform his supervisors of the kidnapping may have
simply been an individual oversight, as the German intelligence service
claims.' 99 But the incident points to the lack of transparency in the interac-
tions among intelligence officials around the world and raises questions
about the legitimacy of encouraging closer cooperation among them without
also strengthening the oversight of such interactions.
The first step toward enhancing democratic control over network actions
is to ensure greater transparency. When networks act in a more transparent
fashion, domestic representative branches can step in and reject those net-
work actions and policies that significantly interfere with domestic
20
preferences. Such scrutiny has already occurred in some contexts. For ex-
ample, the U.S. Congress has taken steps to monitor the work of a banking
201
regulation network, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It has
received regular testimony on the progress of the revisions of an interna-
tional banking agreement overseen by the Basel Committee, and it has
called on U.S. banking agencies to report on all proposed recommendations
202
of the Basel Committee before agreeing to them. Similarly, the U.K.
House of Lords has held hearings on the activities of Europol to determine
203
the usefulness of the agency to national law enforcement efforts. Other
national parliaments, as well as the European Parliament, have also re-
viewed Europol's work, and plans are being made for strengthening such
control.' 4 Such legislative oversight leaves room for networks to enforce
common standards, but only up to a point-until their activities conflict
with local values to such a degree that the legislative branch is prompted to
respond. Networks should not resist this legislative supervision. It is a cru-
cial tool for increasing their legitimacy and, ultimately, their effectiveness.
198. Souad Mekhennet & Craig S. Smith, German Spy Agency Admits Mishandling Abduction
Case, N.Y TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A8. The suspect was flown to Afghanistan for interrogation and
then detained in various countries for sixteen months until the CIA realized it had made a mistake
about his identity and returned him to Germany. Id.
199. Id.
200. But see Bignami, supra note 11, at 811.
201. Barr & Miller, supra note 169, at 34; Zaring, supra note 2, at 598-99.
202. Zaring, supra note 2, at 598-99.
203. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
204. Bruggeman, supra note 195, at 267-72.
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Some have also criticized judges for allowing transnational dialogue to
influence their constitutional decisions. When members of the U.S. Supreme
Court cited foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution in Lawrence v.
205 206Texas z°  and Roper v. Simmons, Justice Scalia accused his colleagues of
"'impos[ing] foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.' ,07 Yet to
consider such other perspectives is what one might expect from a judge who
has exchanged ideas with his or her counterparts from abroad. Commenta-
tors have observed that the increasing interactions between U.S. Supreme
Court justices and their foreign peers in face-to-face meetings, conferences,
and rule of law programs likely influenced the opinions in Roper and Law-
rence.208 Some have welcomed these interactions on the grounds that they
"broaden the perspectives" of the judges and "socialize their members as
participants in a common global judicial enterprise., 20 9 But others, like Jus-
tice Scalia, have been much more skeptical. As Kenneth Anderson has
argued, the issues raised in these constitutional decisions are often tied to
fundamental cultural, political, and legal values of a national community, and
the difference in views among judges of different nations cannot be resolved
simply through repeated dialogue. 2 Anderson and others have suggested that
when American judges adopt the views of their foreign counterparts, their
decisions lack democratic legitimacy.2 I The strength of this criticism can be
questioned, however, on the ground that courts are by nature counter-
majoritarian institutions that are not supposed to be governed by the prefer-
ences of the public."'
To the extent that this type of counter-majoritarianism remains a con-
cern, it is limited to those rare instances when transnational judicial dialogue
affects constitutional decisions. In the vast majority of cases, the decisions
of network participants-whether courts interpreting statutes or regulators
promulgating new standards-can be overseen and overturned by domestic
legislatures.
Networks can also hold one another accountable. For example, a global
network of legislators dealing with human rights and national security issues
may monitor the networks of international prosecutors and investigators,
just as the European Parliament and national parliaments have begun doing
205. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (citing international decisions as support for striking down
as unconstitutional a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy).
206. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (using international authorities as support for holding that
state laws permitting the execution of juvenile offenders are unconstitutional).
207. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990, 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
208. Waters, supra note 145, at 496 & n.40.
209. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 99.
210. Anderson, supra note 196, at 1286-87.
211. Id. at 1287; see also Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 58-61 (2004).
212. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 101-02




with respect to transnational-crimes networks such as Europol and Euro-
just.2 3 Alliances of international criminal defense attorneys can also provide
a check on prosecutorial and investigative networks. International defense
attorneys' associations have already begun doing so by filing amicus briefs
in domestic courts on international criminal law questions, developing their
own model codes of international criminal law and procedure, and getting
involved in the work of other emerging networks in international criminal
law.2 4
Similarly, human rights NGOs are likely to play an important role in
monitoring judicial, prosecutorial, and law enforcement initiatives at the
transnational level. For example, the International Center for Transitional
Justice ("ICTJ"), which assists domestic transitional justice efforts upon
invitation by local authorities or NGOs, works together with local civil soci-
ety to assess the good faith of government actors in pursuing transitional
justice. When President Kostunica invited ICTJ to help with the creation of
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Serbia, the Center was concerned
about the government's motivations in establishing the Commission and
215about the independence of the officials who would be assigned to the task.
The Center therefore joined efforts with the International Humanitarian Law
Institute, a local NGO, to ensure that transitional justice measures were pur-
sued in good faith . 6
In the end, despite a degree of democratic deficit, networks are arguably
more accountable in their operations than supranational institutions. If ICC
investigators, prosecutors, or judges make a decision that conflicts with do-
mestic preferences, there is little that domestic authorities can do to override
it, short of leaving the court or possibly withholding funding.2 7 The only
mechanism provided by the ICC Statute for national governments to register
their disagreement with the court's priorities and actions is through the As-
sembly of States Parties. But each state will have only one vote in an
assembly that makes decisions by majority or supermajority vote. 219 And
even when a state gathers a coalition sufficient to carry a vote in the Assem-
bly, it is not clear that the Assembly's decisions will have real influence on
prosecutorial and judicial actions at the ICC.22 By contrast, as noted earlier,networks can be checked more effectively by domestic legislatures and by
213. See Bruggeman, supra note 195, at 267-72.
214. See, e.g., International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, Mission,
http://www.aiad-icdaa.org/mission.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
215. Interview with Marieke Wierda, supra note 53.
216. Id.
217. Turner, supra note 39, at 19-20. For a discussion of the different ways in which a state
can record its disagreement with an international institution such as the ICC, see Laurence R.
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1580-84 (2005).
218. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 38, art. 112, para. 2.
219. Id. art. 112, para. 7 (providing that the Assembly will make decisions by majority on
procedural issues and by two-thirds majority on substantive issues).
220. See Turner, supra note 39, at 19-20.
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other transnational networks. This is so because they operate through more
informal rules and depend more heavily on domestic authority to enforce
their decisions than do international organizations.
C. Dominance of Networks by a Few Powerful Countries
A third critique of networks points to the likelihood that networks would
reflect the priorities of their most powerful participants. Instead of encour-
aging the cross-fertilization of ideas, networks may produce a one-way
221export of norms from more powerful countries. Commentators have ob-
served that this has already happened in the areas of antitrust and securities
222 .23regulation, in transnational law enforcement,"' and to some degree, in
224judicial exchanges on human rights questions.
As a preliminary response, it is worth noting that a one-way export of
legal rules does not necessarily mean that these rules are imposed on unwill-
ing recipient states. Countries in transition may wish to import rules from
more developed countries to show their commitment to a particular legal
regime, a break with the past, and a new credibility as an international part-
225ner.
And while it is possible that networks in international criminal law will
replicate disparities in the international system, it is not clear that the prob-
lem would be any greater in networks than it is in traditional international
226 .221institutions or in a system of bilateral agreements. In fact, traditional
relations at the inter-governmental level may lead to greater power asymme-
tries because powerful nations can easily tie concessions in one area to
rewards in another. The EU, for example, has pressured Croatia and Serbia
to cooperate with the ICTY as a condition to qualifying for accession to the
Union; the United States has applied economic rewards and sanctions to the
228former Yugoslavia to push for compliance with the ICTY's orders. Net-
works, by contrast, are typically focused on a single area and cannot offer
rewards in other areas to pressure participants to agree to a network policy.
221. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 229. Even if all states, rich and poor, have a voice in
the collective discussions of networks, having a voice is not the same as being heard. Id.
222. Raustiala, supra note 2, at 32, 68-70.
223. ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 83, at 226-31.
224. See Waters, supra note 145, at 505-29.
225. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Ill YALE L.J.
1935, 2022 (2002); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delega-
tion in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217,218 (2000).
226. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 229.
227. E.g., Juan Forero, Bush's Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2005, at Al.




Instead, even powerful network participants have to rely a great deal more• 229
on persuasion than on sanctions.
Structural solutions can also be used to minimize the influence of pow-
erful states on the outcomes of network deliberations. As mentioned earlier,
joint action networks can be designed in such a way as to give officials and
judges from the host state a greater say over the outcome of the delibera-
tions-for example, by giving local judges a majority on a hybrid court
bench. Such an arrangement would counterbalance some of the power
asymmetries among network participants. More generally, if the transpar-
ency and domestic oversight of networks are strengthened, this will both
increase the networks' political accountability, as discussed earlier, and en-
sure that participants from weaker states are not unduly influenced to import
foreign legal norms.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
As discussed throughout this Article, networks appear to be emerging in
the area of international criminal law. This development may have implica-
tions for transgovernmental networks in other areas. It suggests at least four
possible lessons for the study of networks more generally.
First, the emergence of international criminal law networks indicates
that networks do not require strong cross-border effects in order to develop.
International crimes often have direct impacts in a particular region. They
may produce refugee flows to neighboring countries, and the conflict may
spill over across state boundaries. But unlike terrorism or cybercrime, which
may have direct and practical impacts around the globe, the effects of inter-
national crimes are more likely to be contained to the region and rarely stir
interest among powerful states. As explained in Part III, networks have
arisen in this area largely because NGOs and international organizations
have stepped in and facilitated transgovernmental collaboration. This sug-
gests that in evaluating whether networks are likely to develop in other
areas, scholars must look beyond the immediate incentives of powerful
states and government officials from those states. Instead, it is important to
look at the overall architecture of cooperation at the international level and
see if it is likely to encourage the rise of networks.
Second, the existence of international criminal law networks suggests
that networks can appear even in areas in which there is no imperative to
further standardize rules. International criminal law is already widely stan-
dardized. What networks do here is actually closer to the opposite of their
traditional function: They help create ways to accommodate different ap-
proaches to interpreting and enforcing international law. Because networks
229. Moreover, at least in the current political climate, the lack of consensus among powerful
states on issues of international criminal law is likely to prevent one of them from establishing its
vision against the wishes of weaker states. For example, while the European Union is urging coun-
tries to disavow the use of the death penalty even in international crimes prosecutions, the contrary
position on this issue by the United States provides an important counterweight. E.g., Peter Ford,
Iraqi Tribunal Stirs Fierce Debate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2003, at 6.
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rely heavily on deliberation and persuasion to create and implement stan-
dards, they are better able to tolerate different viewpoints and find pragmatic
solutions to sensitive political questions. This enhances the political accept-
ability of the transnational norms that networks aim to enforce.
Third, international criminal law networks suggest that the presence of
formal, government-sponsored international organizations can assist the
creation of informal networks, rather than competing with them. This con-
firms the insight of early network theorists that transgovernmental
cooperation is more likely to occur in areas in which established interna-
tional organizations operate.23 ° Organizations such as the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and the ICC have promoted the development
of networks in international criminal law. This is in large part because they
depend greatly on national authorities for the enforcement of their orders. In
the case of the ICC, it occurs also because the court is committed to com-
plementarity-that is, deferring to national governments and allowing them
to act whenever possible. It may be that international organizations in other
areas will better promote the development of informal networks if they also
apply the complementarity principle. Institutions that respect complementar-
ity can partner with networks to build domestic capacity to enforce
international law. Networks, in turn, can serve as conduits of information
between domestic and international authorities and promote greater under-
standing between them.
Finally, the significant contribution by NGOs to the emergence of inter-
national criminal law networks suggests that NGOs can play an important
role in the development of other networks as well. They can raise public
awareness of global problems and prompt states to take action on issues that
state officials might otherwise have chosen to ignore. Pressure to act creates
incentives for state officials to seek knowledge and capacity from other
places, which instigates the formation of networks. And as networks begin
to operate, NGOs may continue to be a resource for them by sharing infor-
mation and expertise and joining efforts to build domestic legal and
administrative capacity. The key role played by NGOs in international
criminal law may repeat itself in other areas.
CONCLUSION
International criminal law is not, at first sight, an area in which one
would expect to see networks develop. It does not call for convergence of
rules and strategies, unlike other areas in which networks have been active.
Moreover, international criminal law is still a very politically charged area,
in which moral and political judgments differ.
Nonetheless, international criminal law networks have begun to develop
and are likely to grow for three principal reasons. First, networks can help
domestic authorities build up capacity to prosecute international crimes.
Second, when making and enforcing international rules, networks are likely
230. Keohane & Nye, supra note 9, at 50.
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to be more responsive to domestic political views and more democratically
accountable than are centralized institutions such as the ICC. Third, by em-
powering local judges, prosecutors, and investigators who are committed to
international criminal law, networks may be able to nudge even reluctant
governments toward more consistent enforcement of the law.
Given these important advantages of networks, the international com-
munity, and the ICC in particular, should actively encourage contacts and
alliances among judges, prosecutors, and investigators. These alliances may
serve primarily coordination and support functions, like the network of war
crimes investigators initiated by Interpol. Or they could take the shape of
more institutionalized joint action networks, as the hybrid courts established
in East Timor and Sierra Leone. The choice between the type of network
will depend on the premium that participants place on capacity-building
versus informality, local control, and efficiency. In the end, both types of
networks carry the promise of steering international criminal law toward
fuller enforcement and broader political acceptability.
